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INTRODUCTION: THE COMMISSION'S
INVESTIGATION AND HEARINGS

Under the authority granted by Governor Mario M. Cuomo's Executive Order
establishing the Commission on Government Integrity, 1 the Commission conducted an
investigation into certain personnel procedures and practices of the City of New York and, on
January 9 and 11 and April 4 and 5, 1989, held public hearings concerning that investigation.
This report contains the Commission's findings from the investigation and its recommendations
addressing certain shortcomings disclosed by the investigation.
The Commission's investigation and hearings, and this report, present a case
study of the influence of political patronage on certain City personnel procedures and practices,
primarily during 1983-86. The report focuses on the involvement of the Mayor's Office2 (and,
in particular, the Mayor's Talent Bank) in personnel procedures and practices during that time
period and on two large mayoral agencies, the Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP") and the Department of Transportation ("DOT'). 3
Patronage involves the hiring and firing of public employees with political
considerations playing an important, if not necessarily dispositive, role in the decision. In its
classic form, it involves the hiring of individuals referred or endorsed by political leaders, in
return for their political support. In a government characterized by patronage, public sector
jobs are viewed as benefits controlled by those in power, who may distribute them as they
choose, and may use them to reward supporters, favor friends or punish opponents.
Patronage is thus distinguished from the "merit system," which dictates a
separation of politics from public personnel administration, a set of objective criteria for public
sector jobs, and open competition for those jobs, with hiring, promotion and termination
decisions based upon ability and performance as measured against those objective criteria. In a
1 Paragraph I of Executive Order No. 88.1 (April 21, 1987) directs the Commission, inter alia, to investigate the management
and affairs of any political subdivision of the State in respect to ·the adequacy of laws, regulations and procedures relating to
maintaining ethical practices and standards in government, assuring that public servants are duly accountable for the faithful
discharge of the public trust reposed In them, and preventing favoritism, conflicts of interest, undue influence and abuse of official
position and to make recommendations for action to strengthen or improve such laws, regulations or procedures.
2 The Office of the Mayor, a separate agency with its own budget and staff (see p. 8 below), is referred to throughout this
report as the 'Mayor's Office.•
3 A glossary of abbreviations is annexed as Attachment A.

-1-

·-

merit system, public employees are seen as public servants, whose duty is to deliver services to
all citizens effectively and fairly, and whose allegiance is to the general welfare instead of to a
political group. Thus, public jobs belong to the public and should be made available and fairly
distributed to all who meet non-political criteria.
Abolishing patronage is, therefore, strongly relevant to the quest for ethical
government. When political considerations affect, and are perceived to affect, hiring and other
personnel decisions, government in~vitably suffers. Even if the number of personnel actions
that are tainted by politics is limited, a general sense of unfairness is engendered that can erode
public confidence in government integrity and harm the productivity, morale and sense of
professionalism of ethical, hard-working City employees. Although the Commission has not
made and could not make an exhaustive study of the entire New York City personnel system,
important lessons can be learned from the parts of that system the Commission has examined.
(See Section V, Recommendations, below.)
Some of the City's affirmative action efforts are implicated by this investigation,
particularly those relating to the Mayor's Talent Bank, but affirmative action is not the focus of
this Commission. Although the Commission concludes that the Talent Bank's affirmative action
efforts were undermined in the 1983-86 period by efforts to benefit job candidates with political
pedigrees, this report should not be read as an evaluation of the City's affirmative action
achievements in general.
In the course of the investigation, Commission staff interviewed scores of
witnesses, reviewed thousands of pages of documents from City files ·and els~where, and took
private sworn testimony from 49 individuals, including many of the 20 witnesses who testified
publicly. 4 Commission members and staff also consulted with experts in public administration
· and personnel policy. 5
Sections I-Ill contain the Commission's factual findings and Sections IV and V
are devoted to the Commission's conclusions and recommendations for reform. After providing
an overview of the role of the Mayor's Office in City personnel practices, Section I examines
the creation of the Mayor's Talent Bank and its operation in the period from 1983 to 1986,
other job-referral activities of the Mayor's Office, the early 1986 destruction of certain Talent
Bank records, and subsequent changes in the operation of the Talent Bank. Sections IT and III
explore the Mayor's Office's role in and effect on the personnel practices at DEP and DOT,

4 A list of witnesses who testified at the public hearings is annexed as Attachment 8 .
5 A list of the experts consulted by the Commission is annexed as Attachment C.
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respectively. An Appendix, titled "DeVincenzo's Retirement," contains the Commission's factual
findings concerning certain events which followed the Commission's January, 1989 public
hearings and a recommendation concerning pension forfeiture, a related subject of concern to
the Commission.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This report describes certain patronage practices which existed in the period
from 1983 through 1986 in the New York City personnel system. During this period,
employees of the Mayor's Office played important roles in referring candidates for a wide
variety of City jobs to mayoral agencies. This referral function was performed primarily by a
unit of the Mayor's Office which came to be called the Mayor's Talent Bank. Although the
Talent Bank was designed to broaden the pool of applicants for jobs by accepting referrals from
a variety of sources including political figures, one of its major objectives was to promote the
hiring of women and minorities. Throughout the 1983-86 period, Joseph DeVincenzo, a special
assistant to the Mayor, exercised overall responsibility for the Talent Bank. During this same
peri.od, however, DeVincenzo and members of his staff also played a key oversight role in
monitoring and approving agency personnel actions.
The consolidation of job referral and personnel oversight authority played a
central role in the patronage practices described in this report. DeVincenzo's personnel
oversight powers served as a lever to induce DEP and DOT to hire and extend favorable
treatment to candidates referred by the Mayor's Office. And the primary concern of the Talent
Bank during this period was to place candidates with political pedigrees, not to promote the
hiring of women and minorities.
As a result, the affirmative action objectives of the Talent Bank were undercut.
Moreover, typical consequences of patronage ensued: agency effectiveness was impaired;
employee morale was seriously eroded; and employees became vulnerable to pressures to
engage in improper conduct and to fudge, if not break, established procedures for hiring and
promoting personnel.
The Commission's recommendations flow directly from the weaknesses of policy,
management practices, and structure which this investigation has revealed. They entail a
restructuring of the New York City personnel system to discourage patronage, including the
transfer of day-to-day supervisory authority over personnel matters from the Mayor's Office to
the Department of Personnel; an establishment of a separate Appointments Office to handle ·
the small number of senior, policy-level positions for which political considerations are relevant;
strict legal requirements for providing widespread notice of employment opportunities;
development of equitable screening procedures to assure that jobs are open to all; and a drastic
reduction in the percentage of provisional employees.

..
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I

THE ROLE OF THE MAYOR'S OFFICE
IN NEW YORK CITY AGENCY PERSONNEL MATTERS

A.

The Mayoral Agency Work Force

The Commission's investigation explored the role of the Mayor's Office in
personnel matters for mayoral agencies6 throughout New York City. Of necessity, that role is
greatest with respect to discretionary employees, that is, employees who are not hired from civil
service lists as a result of competitive examinations.7
Data provided by the City indicate that the number and percentage of
discretionary employees in mayoral agencies have increased over the last decade. 8 In 1978, the
total number of employees in mayoral agencies was 101,193. Of that total, 90,486 (89.4%) were
competitive, permanent employees, while 10,707 (10.6%) were discretionary employees. By
1986, the number of mayoral agency employees increased to 137,257, of which 102,134 (74.4%)
were competitive, permanent employees, and 35,123 (25.6%) were discretionary employees. By
1988, discretionary employees comprised 30.2% (44,869 out of 148,420) of the mayoral agency
work force.
In fact, between 1978 and 1988 the number of discretionary employees increased
fourfold while the total mayoral agency work force increased by less than 50%. 9

6 Mayoral agencies are defined as those under the direct jurisdiction of the Mayor of the City of. New York.
7 'Discretionary employees,' as reported by the New York City Department of Personnel, Include employees who hold
positions which are exempt from civil service; temporary employees who are hired for specified periods of time to perform specific
tasks; civil service employees who are provisionally hired (in the absence of a competitively ranked list); and non-competitive civil
service employees such as those in laborer positions for which a formal examination may not be appropriate. New York Civil
ServicE' Law§§ 41-43, 64, 65.
8 The statistics cited throughout this section are culled from the Annual Reports of the New York City Department of Personnel
to the New York State Department of Civil Service and compiled at Attachment D.
9 See Attachment D.
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B.

The Authority Of The Mayor's Office
Over Agency Personnel Matters

·-

The Mayor's Office, consisting of approximately 1,000 employees with an annual
budget of approximately $70 million, 10 exercises wide-ranging authority over personnel matters
in mayoral agencies. The Department of Personnel ("DOP"), a separate mayoral agency with
over 500 employees and a $30 million annual budget, also has responsibilities for agency
personnel matters, some of which it exercises in conjunction with the Mayor's Office.11

1.

PAR And MPD Authority

Joseph DeVincenzo, a special assistant to the Mayor, exercised key aspects of
the authority of the Mayor's Office over agency personnel actions throughout the period from
1983 to 1986, indeed until his resignation in February 1989. DeVincenzo and his staff exercised
this authority principally through the review and approval process for Planned Action Reports
("P ARs") and Managerial Position Descriptions ("MPDs").
PARs are forms submitted by mayoral agencies on a monthly basis to the
Mayor's Office for the purpose (insofar as is relevant to personnel matters) of obtaining
approval to hire, promote, give a raise to, change the title of, transfer or demote a City
employee. 12 Thus, in essence, mayoral agencies submitted PARs in connection with all
significant personnel actions relating to their employees. As James Hein, DeVincenzo's
principal aide for PAR matters, testified: "Just about anything that can happen to a City
employee has to come through my desk." 13
Although PARs were also submitted to DOP and the Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB"), DeVincenzo's office was the decisive force in the PAR approval process. 14

1O Jan. Tr. at 455-56. References in this format are to pages of the transcript of the Commission's January 9 and 11, 1989
public hearings.
11 Other entities with authority over agency personnel matters include the Office of Management and Budget ('OMB') and
the Office of Municipal Labor Relations ('OMLR') .

12 DeVincenzo at 44-45, 50; Hein at 11-12. References in this format, i.e., with the name of a witness and page number,
are to pages of that witness' private hearing transcript. At the request of the New York County District Attorney, the Commission
is not making public any witness' private hearing transcript at this time.
13 Hein at 3.

14 Hein at 52-53; DeVincenzo at 51 .
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As DeVincenzo testified, DOP's and OMB's review of PARs was "based on a technical aspect
of the process." 15 Indeed, when asked what DOP's role was in the process, Hein testified that
it had no real role. 16 Moreover, the Mayor's Office was the final sign-off authority on PARs, 17
communicating the outcome of the review process in the form of a letter commonly known
throughout City personnel circles as the "Joe D. letter."

The receipt of a Joe D. letter was crucial to a range of personnel actions subject
to "pre-audit" review. These actions --- which included all actions affecting managerial
employees (such as hires, promotions or raises) and certain other actions affecting nonmanagerial employees (such as hires, promotions or transfers after which the employee would
be paid a salary in excess of that prescribed by various guidelines) --- could not be effectuated
by agencies until after PARs were submitted and the requisite Joe D. letter obtained. 18 Most
personnel actions, however, were subject to "post-audit" or after-the-fact review. 19 In other
words, all personnel actions that did not fall withjn the class of actions subject to "pre-audit"
review could be implemented by agencies without first obtaining a Joe D. letter. Agencies,
however, were still required to submit PARs relating to these actions to DeVincenzo's office for
after-the-fact review and approval. 20
Each PAR, be it "pre-audit" or "post-audit", had to provide a written justification
for the particular personnel action it described, and DeVincenzo's office reviewed the
sufficiency of the justification.21 An important function of the PAR review process was to set

15 DeVincenzo at 47.
16 Hein at 53.
17 DeVincenzo at 71, 73.
18 Hein at 20, 42-46.
19 DeVincenzo at 34.
20 This 'pre-audif and 'post-audit" system was instituted in 1980 pursuant to Mayoral Directive 80-1, which DeVincenzo helped
write. (DeVincenzo at 75.) This directive established a general policy of post-audit review of mayoral agency personnel actions
provided that agencies operated within their budgetary guidelines set by OMB and acted in accordance with civil service law.
Directive 80-1, however, stated that the application of the post-audit policy was a 'privilege' that could be withdrawn at any time.
Directive 80-1 specified the various kinds of personnel actions subject to 'pre-audif and 'post-audif review. The kinds of
actions subject to pre-audit review expanded in the years following the issuance of 80-1 . (DeVincenzo at 161-62.) Most notably,
the hiring of labor class employees became subject to 'pre-audif review in 1986. DeVincenzo at 110-13.
2 1 DeVincenzo at 352-53; Hein at 24, 28-31 .
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the salary of mayoral agency employees. 22

DeVincenzo exercised additional authority in the MPD review process. When
agencies sought to create a new managerial position or upgrade an existing managerial position,
they were required to submit MPDs to DeVincenzo's office and to DOP. 23 These forms
describe the prospective responsibilities of the new or upgraded position and request that a
particular "M" level be assigned to the position. 24 The City's managerial classification system
consists of ten managerial, or "M" levels, with Ml the lowest and MlO the highest level. Since
MPDs relate to managerial employees, they are subject to "pre-audit" review. 25 Accordingly,
agencies cannot hire a new manager or promote an incumbent manager until the need for a
new manager and the particular "M" level to be assigned is reviewed and approved.
Until 1987, DeVincenzo's office and DOP exercised joint authority over all
MPDs.
When beVincenzo's office completed its review, 27 it communicated its position to
DOP and DOP in tum communicated the outcome of the review process (i.e., approval or
rejection of the prospective managerial position or approval of the position at a lower "M"
level) to the agencies. 28 Although DOP and DeVincenzo's office jointly determined whether to
approve the creation or upgrading of a managerial position and the particular "M" level to be
assigned to the new or upgraded position, it was DeVincenzo's office which reviewed and
approved --- through the PAR process --- agency decisions concerning the candidate chosen and
the salary to be paid. 29 Since these decisions were subject to pre-audit review, they could not
26

22 Hein at 27. Generally, agencies could pay an employee in a particular job title a salary within a specified range. If, for
example, an agency sought to hire a new employee and pay a salary above the minimum amount specified for the position,
DeVincenzo's staff reviewed the justification proffered by the agency and, on the basis of such factors as the prior salary history
of the candidate, the salary paid to comparable employees or the salary paid to subordinates, would determine either to approve
the salary at the amount requested or at a lower amount within the applicable range. Hein at 24, 28-31.
23 DeVincenzo at 35; Skolnick at 42. (Barry Skolnick, a Mayor's Office employee, worked on MPDs during the relevant time
period.)
24 DeVincenzo at 26, 129;. Hein at 14, 17.
25 DeVincenzo at 34, 99-100; Hein at 20, 42-43.
26 In 1987, First Deputy Mayor Brezenoff altered the authority of the Mayor's Office and DOP over MPDs: DOP became the
lead office in MPD review and review of MPDs by DeVincenzo's office, particularly those relating to managerial positions at levels
M1 through M4, was curtailed. Brezenoff at 221-23; DeVincenzo at 27-29, 36-37; Skolnick at 17-20, 27-28, 44.
27 DeVincenzo's staff evaluated MPDs against criteria such as the type and nature of the supervisory duties of the position,
whether the putative manager's subordinates would be clericals or professionals, the extent to which the position entailed budgetary
responsibilities and the level of expertise called for by the position. Skolnick at 22-23.
28 Skolnick at 23, 32.
29 Skolnick at 34; Hein at 24, 28-31 .
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be implemented without a Joe D. letter. 30

2.

Vacancy Notification Procedures

A mayoral directive issued on April 18, 1983 established new hiring procedures
for positions at mayoral agencies, other than those governed by a current civil service list.
Under these procedures, as supplemented by subsequent directives, agencies were required to
submit written notice of job vacancies to the Mayor's Office. The Mayor's Office was to be
accorded at least ten working days following receipt of the notice in which to submit the names
of candidates for the vacant positions. The final decision concerning the selection of a
candidate was to remain with the agency, but mayoral agencies were prohibited by the directive
from selecting candidates without considering candidates supplied by the Mayor's Office. In the
event an agency determined not to hire a Mayor's Office candidate, it 'Yas obliged to explain
why.31
The promulgation of this April 1983 directive added to DeVincenzo's personnel
authority. His office received the vacancy notices called for by the directive and referred
candidates in response to the notices. Through the PAR review process, moreover,
DeVincenzo's office enforced compliance with the directive's requirement that candidates
referred in response to the vacancy notices be considered and adequate explanations be given if
Mayor's Office candidates were not selected.

C.

The Creation And Operation Of The Talent Bank: 1983-86

By promulgating the procedures requiring notice to the Mayor's Office of job
vacancies, the Mayor's April 18, 1983 directive, in effect, created the Mayor's Talent Bank. 32
As Mayor Koch has stated, in both his private and public appearances before the Commission,

30 DeVincenzo at 99-100; Hein at

42-43.

31 Koch at 94; April Tr. at 561 ; April Exhibit 1. {References in this format are to pages of the transcript of the Commission's
April 4 and 5, 1989 public hearings and exhibits introduced at those hearings.) An earlier directive, Mayoral Directive 78-11 ,
issued in 1978 established posting requirements for job vacancies. The directive required that public notices be prominently
posted by all City agencies, placed on file at DOP and published in the City Record. The purpose of this directive was to broaden
the pool of applicants and thus increase competition for City jobs. Koch at 103.
32 The term 'Mayor's Talent Bank,' was coined later. A press release issued by the Mayor on June 28, 1983 referred rather
to the 'minority recruitment program announced April 18.' The unit of DeVincenzo's staff that implemented the new notification
procedures and referred candidates from the Mayor's Office later became known as the 'Talent Bank.'

-·
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a "major component" of the Talent Bank was affirmative action. 33 Increasing the number of
minorities and women in the City's work force, however, was not the Talent Bank's sole
objective. In his private appearance before the Commission, Mayor Koch stated that he
established the Talent Bank for affirmative action purposes and
also [to] accommodate the political need when people would say,
"Now listen, we are supporting the administration. We worked for
you. We are not asking that you give us a job, but give us an
opportunity to submit people so that you can consider them .... "34
Similarly, the Mayor's April 18, 1983 directive alludes to two purposes underlying the new
procedures it mandated: (1) "guarantee[ing] that the City is maximizing its efforts to attract
wom{;n and members of minority groups to city service" and (2) ensuring that agencies would
"have the widest selection of candidates from which to choose including qualified women,
members of minority groups, and individuals recommended by civic and political organizations."35
The Talent Bank, accordingly, was also designed to meet a perceived political
need by providing a mechanism through which individuals referred by political figures 36 would
be considered for City jobs. As is discussed below, this objective of the Talent Bank seriously
undercut its affirmative action goals. 37

1.

De Vincenzo's View Of The Talent Bank's Purposes

In November 1985, DeVincenzo appointed Nydia Padilla-Barham ("Padilla") as
the director of the Talent Bank. 38 In the course of familiarizing herself with the Talent Bank's
operations, Padilla reviewed computer printouts relating to the candidates previously placed in

33 Koch at 65-66; April Tr. at 560-61.

34 Koch at 66.
35 April Exhibit 1. The Mayor referred to both of the Talent Bank's objectives when he announced its creation. April Tr. at

605-06.

36 The term 'political figure' as used in this report includes both elected public officials, such as borough presidents, and
leaders of political parties, such as district or county leaders.
37 On July 14, 1989, Mayor Koch made public two reports containing historical descriptions of the Talent Bank which are
at odds with or ignore certain of the evidence considered and factual findings made by the Commission in this report, particularly
the evidence and findings concerning the preferences accorded candidates referred by political figures.

38 Jan. Tr. at 61 .
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jobs and those currently pending. 39 She concluded that the number of candidates successfully
referred by the Talent Bank was low and, given her understanding that the primary purpose of
the Talent Bank was to promote the hiring of minorities and women, that the pending
candidates included relatively few minorities. 40 At the time, the Talent Bank's recruitment
efforts were negligible and no member of its staff was engaged in any recruitment activities. 41
Its four full-time staff members consisted of Luz Morales, the "coordinator" who supervised the
daily activities of the other staff; Denita Williams, who was responsible for entering data into
and retrieving it from the Talent Bank's computer; and Magaly Maldonado and Annette
Luyanda-Medina ("Luyanda"), who performed clerical duties. 42 Accordingly, Padilla's first
proposal to DeVincenzo was that the Talent Bank hire a full-time recruiter to publicize the
Talent Bank, open up the Talent Bank to the general public and increase recruitment of
minorities and women. 43
Padilla testified that DeVincenzo's response was a "sharp, no."44 Although
"street resumes" (unsolicited resumes submitted by the general public), were "okay," he
explained to Padilla that "the real purpose [of the Talent Bank] is ... these political resumes
that are submitted to us .... "45 Her "main goal," according to DeVincenzo, was to track and
follow-up on resumes referred by political figures to make sure that they were being referred
for vacancies. 46 Padilla was further instructed to keep Hein informed when resumes referred by
political figures were forwarded to agencies so that Hein could follow-up on them with the
agencies. 47 And, as DeVincenzo told her at this or a later meeting, she should keep him

39 Jan. Tr. at 66-67; Padilla Feb. at 21. References in this format are to pages of Padilla's February 24, 1988 private hearing
transcript. References to 'Padilla Sept. at_. are to Padilla's September 13, 1988 private hearing transcript.
40 Jan. Tr. at 66-67; Padilla Feb. at 17; Padilla Sept. at 16.
41 Jan. Tr. at 67-08; Padilla Sept. at 17-18.
42 Jan. Tr. at 62; Padilla Sept. at 13-14.

43 Jan. Tr. at 67-08; Padilla Feb. at 18.
44 Jan. Tr. at 68; Padilla Sept. at 18.

45 Jan. Tr. at 69; Padilla Feb. at 22-23, 92-94 ; Padilla Sept. at 18-19.

46 Jan. Tr. at 69-70; Padilla Feb. at 22·23.
47 Jan. Tr. at 70; Padilla Sept. at 20.
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apprised of the status of these referrals so that he could answer the questions he received from
the political figures who referred the candidates. 48

2.

The Talent Bank Computer, The Black Book,
Resume Cover Sheets And Colored Folders

The record-keeping practices of the Talent Bank afford additional proof that
advancing the hiring of politically referred candidates was DeVincenzo's chief concern.
Through its computer, the Talent Bank was able systematically to keep track of and monitor
the progress of politically referred resumes. In February 1985, the Talent Bank had acquired its
own office space on the first floor of 52 Chambers Street, across from City Hall. 49 As of then,
if not earlier, the Talent Bank computer was able to "look up" the pending candidates and the
hired candidates submitted by a particular referral source and, upon command, print a listing of
that source's pending or hired candidates. 50
These "source" printouts were regularly used to apprise DeVincenzo of the status
of candidates submitted by political figures. During the brief period (a matter of a few months)
after Padilla became the director of the Talent Bank and before the purging of referral source
information from its files and computer (see Section l.D. below), Padilla met with DeVincenzo
on at least a bi-weekly basis. 51 Consistent with DeVincenzo's instructions that she should track
the politically referred resumes and keep him apprised of their status, Padilla reported on
recent Talent Bank placements. 52 DeVincenzo "always wanted to know the source" of
placements 53 and Padilla provided him with printouts, including printouts containing information
concerning the referral source of Talent Bank candidates. 54
48 Padilla Sept. at 18-19. The accuracy of this account is corroborated by the fact that, among other things, the Talent
Bank had been operating for more than two years without a recruiter on its staff. The Talent Bank did receive referrals from the
Mayor's Minority Affairs and Hispanic Affairs Advisors and politically referred candidates were not exclusively white males. And
efforts were made to obtain female candidates from a women's organization. However, the Talent Bank did not have any recruiting
staff until the Spring of 1986. Padilla Feb. at 10-11, 88.
49 Previously, the members of DeVincenzo's staff who performed Talent Bank duties were located in City Hall in Room 1 •
- the basement office area which included DeVincenzo's office - and in an adjoining room, Room 3-A.

50 Jan. Tr. at 73-74; April Tr. at 134-35.
51 Jan. Tr. at 80-81; Padilla Sept. at 29-30; Padilla Feb. at 30.

52 .!Q.
53 Padilla Feb. at 30.
54 Jan. Tr. at 80, 82-83; Padilla Sept. at 29-30; Padilla Feb. at 30.
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Before Padilla became the director of the Talent Bank, Hein (who was then
responsible for the Talent Bank as well as his PAR duties) requested and obtained Talent Bank
computer printouts. In addition to requests for printouts concerning the status of individual
candidates, Hein frequently requested printouts of all pending and hired candidates referred by
particular political figures. 55 Hein requested the printouts from Morales who would direct the
Talent Bank's computer operator (Williams or her predecessor) to generate them. 56
The Talent Bank's computer contained referral source information well before
the Talent Bank moved from City Hall to 52 Chambers Street. Vickie Moffitt, a Mayor's
Office employee who had various responsibilities while working under DeVincenzo from
January 1979 to February 1985, was asked by DeVincenzo in late 1983 or early 1984 to
computerize the Talent Bank. 57 At DeVincenzo's direction, referral source information was
entered into the Talent Bank's then relatively unsophisticated computer. 58 As Moffitt stated in
private sworn testimony:
[DeVincenzo] wanted to be able to pull out [of the computer]
how many candidates were placed in jobs, how many candidates
didn't get jobs, what the jobs were, all of blank's candidates, all
of, say, John LoCicero's candidates, which of them got jobs, which
of them didn't.

* * *
The referral source was important. You know, it had to be in
there, it was always part of it. That was always important...because one of the reports Joe wanted was to be able to see by
referral source who got a job and who didn't, how many jobs
people had gotten by referral source .... He said that's what he
wanted to know. 59
Moffitt, accordingly, designed forms containing various information relating to
each Talent Bank candidate and the forms had a space in which the referral source of the

55 Jan. Tr. at 163-64, 179; Maldonado at 81-90; Luyanda at 26, 35-36.

56 Jan. Tr. at 163-64, 179; Maldonado at 81-90; Luyanda at 26, 35-36.
57 Moffitt at 2, 10, 23.

58 Moffitt at 10-11.
59 Moffitt at 11, 36-37.

..
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candidate was entered. 60 The information in the forms was then entered into the computer. 61
The computer equipment then in use could only keep track of such information as the job
qualifications and referral source of candidates; it could not "match" candidates with job
vacancies. 62
Because DeVincenzo wanted the Talent Bank's computer to match candidates
with job vacancies, Moffitt obtained the assistance of the New York City Financial Information
Services Agency ("FISA") in the Spring of 1984.63 FISA employees worked on a program for a
FISA mainframe computer that would permit matching. 64 Helen Mosley, a FISA employee who
became a Mayor's Office employee in October 1984, worked on this program and subsequently
developed a program for the personal computer system that the Talent Bank was using by
February 1985.65
According to Mosley, whose testimony on this subject is in accord with Moffitt's,
including referral source information in the computer system "was just always part of it from the
beginning, just always part of it."66 Referral source information was needed because
DeVincenzo "always wanted to know what happened when people were referred by other
people."67
Also for this reason, Mosley created the "Black Book," a large, three-ring binder
--- with the words "Talent Bank" printed prominently on its spine --- containing computergenerated listings of pending and hired Talent Bank candidates in its various subdivisions.
Thus, the "Black Book" provided a ready means of identifying, for example, either the pending
or hired candidates referred by a particular source or the source of a pending or hired candidate.

60 !.Q.. at 10, 12.
61 !.Q.. at 10.
62 !.Q.. at 13-14, 19.

63 !.Q.. at 19-20.
64 !.Q.. at 19-21 .
65 April Tr. at 335; Moffitt at 23; Mosley at 4, 135, 140.

66 Mosley at 16.

67 Id. at 20.
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Mosley created the "Black Book" in response to complaints from DeVincenzo's
staff members about the timeliness of reports on Talent Bank candidates 68 and in order to put
comprehensive information at the fingertips of DeVincenzo's staff and thus obviate the need to
generate printouts in response to specific requests for information about Talent Bank candidates. 69 Mosley updated the "Black Book" at least once; for reasons that are not clear, she
apparently updated it for the last time in the Summer of 1985.70
The Commission_also obtained significant documents reflecting Talent Bank
record-keeping practices from Joy Schwartz, an aide to DeVincenzo who was in charge of the
Talent Bank --- reporting directly to DeVincenzo --- for about a one-year period beginning in
early 1984 and ending in early 1985.71 Among the documents obtained from Schwartz are some
350 "resume cover sheets." These resume cover sheets, the existence of which the Commission
first learned from Padilla, Maldonado and Luyanda, are forms which record for each candidate
the relevant data put into the Talent Bank computer. 72 At the top of each form, immediately
adjacent to a space for the name of the candidate, is a space (designated "Source") for his or
her referral source. The source space was completed, in the handwriting of many different
aides to DeVincenzo, on virtually all of the resume cover sheets obtained from Schwartz.
Other documents obtained from Schwartz corroborate the testimony of several
witnesses that letters from political figures and other materials disclosing the referral source of
candidates were included in the Talent Bank's files. 73 Schwartz' own files contained in excess
of thirty letters addressed to DeVincenzo or members of his staff from political figures referring
job candidates. Letters and other documents revealing the referral sources of candidates were

68 Mosley also testified that DeVincenzo made such complaints but was unsure 'whether he complained directly to me or
someone told me he was complaining.' April Tr. at 338-39.
69 April Tr. at 338-39; Mosley at 103-06, 179-80, 182.
70 April Tr. at 340; Mosley at 106, 107, 184-85. Although DeVincenzo denied any knowledge of the 'Black Book,' one
member of his staff - a clerical employee - acknowledged her familiari1y with it and testified that she saw it in DeVincenzo's office
on one occasion. (Barlow at 29, 32, 37-39.) Mosley testified that when she first created and updated the Black Book she placed
it on a shelf above the desk of DeVincenzo's secretary. April Tr. at 340; Mosley at 106, 183-85.
Padilla provided the 'Black Book' to the Commission. She, in turn, received it from DeVincenzo. During the course of
a meeting in December, 1985 or January, 1986, DeVincenzo mentioned a book that had been prepared for him and asked that
it be brought to the meeting. He then gave that book (the 'Black Book') to Padilla telling her that she could use its format or
develop a different means of keeping him posted about the Talent Bank's candidates. Jan. Tr. at 83.
71

April Tr. at 106-07, 109.

72 Sample copies of resume cover sheets are reproduced as Attachment E.
73 Jan. Tr. at 113, 151-52; Maldonado at 41-43, 75, 97-98; Luyanda at 7, 20; Padilla Feb. at 20, 47.
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routed from DeVincenzo to the Talent Bank. 74 Indeed, these~letters and documents were
apparently the primary means by which the source of a resume could be identified for purposes
of completing the "source" space on resume cover sheets.
At least for a brief period of time prior to the purging of referral source
documents from the Talent Bank's files, the individual candidate folders were color-coded. 75
The resumes and other materials relating to politically referred candidates --- or the most
important, or "hottest," of these sources --- were stored in red folders while the resumes of
unreferred, "street" candidates were stored in green folders. 76

3.

The Preferential Treatment Accorded To Politically
Referred Candidates By The Talent Bank

Following the Talent Bank's move in February 1985 to 52 Chambers Street,
politically referred resumes received special treatment at every phase of the Talent Bank's
processes. When resumes were received at the Talent Bank,n application forms were mailed to
the candidates. Politically referred resumes were separated from "street" resumes and
application forms were mailed first to the politically referred candidates.78 When applications
were returned, the resumes and accompanying materials were sent in batches of ten to Harry
Shapiro for classification. 79 Here, too, candidates whose resumes were referred by political
figures often went to the head of the line. Batches of politically referred resumes were

74 April Tr. at 136-37. When the Talent Bank obtained its own office space at 52 Chambers Street in February 1985, these
letters and documents were routed (along with accompanying resumes) to the Talent Bank and then to the office of Harry Shapiro.
Shapiro evaluated Talent Bank resumes to determine the particular job titles for which candidates qualified. The various papers
relating to candidates were then returned to the Talent Bank for filing after the computer operator entered the relevant data about
the candidates into the Talent Bank computer. (Jan. Tr. at 63-64, 150-53, 159; Maldonado at 35-37, 39-41 ; Luyanda at 5, 9-11,
14.) A similar procedure obtained before the Talent Bank moved to 52 Chambers Street. Maldonado at 12-16, 19-21 .
75 Jan. Tr. at 159-60; Maldonado at 44, 46-47, 78.
76 J.2. Due to the passage of time and the brevity of the period in which this color-coding scheme was employed, Maldonado
and Luyanda are less than clear about the meaning of the other colored folders. These witnesses, however, corroborated each
other with respect to the existence of the color-coded folders , and they both are corroborated on that point by Padilla. Jan. Tr.
at 89-91 .

n

For the most part, unreferred or 'streer resumes came to the Talent Bank through the mail. Politically referred resumes
came to the Talent Bank from DeVincenzo's office and were often delivered by Hein. (Jan. Tr. at 150-51 .) They were received
by DeVincenzo from a variety of sources, including the Mayor's special advisor John LoCicero and directly from political figures.

78 Jan. Tr. at 151, 154; Luyanda at 8, 11 .
79 Jan. Tr. at 159; Maldonado at 37.
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regularly sent for classification ahead of street resumes. 80 As Luyanda explained, the resumes
from political figures were processed first "so that in the event that DeVincenzo inquired about
a special candidate or a hot referral, we would be ready to give him an answer. "81
Once the initial processing of resumes was completed and all relevant
information concerning candidates, including the job titles they might qualify for, was entered
into the computer, a candidate could be selected by the computer upon receipt of a vacancy
notice indicating an agency's intention to hire for a particular job title. 82 By entering the
complete information concerning politically referred candidates ahead of the information
concerning "street" referrals, politically referred candidates were accorded another advantage.
When particularly "hot" referred candidates were received, Talent Bank staff
sometimes bypassed the classification step altogether. 83 Morales --- who had previously assisted
Shapiro in his classification duties --- would seek to classify the candidate herself; she explained,
on occasion, "[t]his is a hot person, and we have to try and classify him." 84 "Street" candidates
did not receive such attention.
When the Talent Bank received a vacancy notice indicating that an agency was
seeking to fill one or more vacancies in a particular job title, its computer generated a printout
of the candidates who, on the basis of Shapiro's evaluations, were qualified for the title. 85 On
the printout, referred candidates were printed first, above an alphabetical listing of "street"
referrals. 86 The Talent Bank's staff was encouraged to and, depending on the number of can-

80 Jan. Tr. at 155-56; Maldonado at 76-n; Luyanda at 12.
81

Jan. Tr. at 156. With respect to the Talent Bank's computer, the initial step in processing involved 'logging' into the
computer basic information about the candidates. Here, too, politically referred resumes fared better than street resumes .
(luyanda at 34.) Shortly after her appointment as Talent Bank Director, Padilla obtained a report with respect to the backlog of
resumes awaiting 'logging.' This report discloses that of the 50 pending batches of resumes, all 18 'Referral Batches' had been
logged but only 15 of the 32 'Street Batches' had been logged into the computer. (Padilla Feb. at 88-89.) Luyanda also testified
that there was a 'consistent' backlog of street resumes awaiting classification. Jan. Tr. at 156.
82 Jan. Tr. at 63-64.

83 Jan. Tr. at 156-57; Luyanda at 14.
84 Jan. Tr. at 157.
85 Jan. Tr. at 64-65, 160-61; Luyanda at 21-22.
86 Jan. Tr. at 161; Luyanda at 22. Initially, the name of the referral source was entered into the Talent Bank's computer.
Eventually, however, a code - generally an abbreviation· of the source's name beginning with its first letter - was entered
instead. (Jan. Tr. at 78-79; 115-16; Maldonado at 81, 84, 86; Padilla Sept. at 28.) The code for 'street' referrals was 'ZGEN.'
The apparent and perhaps intended consequence of using a code for 'street' referrals that began with the last letter of the alphabet
was to cause the 'street' referrals to be printed out below all others.

-·
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didates who met the qualifications for the particular vacancy, aid in fact give preferences to the
referred candidates in selecting the candidates who were to be forwarded to the hiring agency
for its consideration. 87
Specifically, Morales instructed Luyanda to obtain candidates from the top list
first.
If Luyanda could obtain enough names from that list, 89 she "wouldn't need to bother
with the second list."90 It "was not a priority" to take into consideration gender, ethnicity or
disability in selecting the candidates to be forwarded to the hiring agency. 91
88

Padilla felt pressure from DeVincenzo and his staff to refer to agencies the
politically referred resumes. Hein, for one, repeatedly told Padilla that the Talent Bank was
not doing a good enough job in getting referred candidates placed. 92 She was criticized if they
were not circulated regularly, called regularly to see if they had been referred and directed to
make sure that they were referred. 93 The pressure was to place the politically referred
candidates, not minorities, women, the handicapped, or Vietnam veterans. 94
Inquiries from DeVincenzo's office concerning the status of politically referred
candidates were a daily event. Several times a day Talent Bank staff were required to answer
inquiries concerning matters such as which agencies a candidate had been referred to, whether
the candidate had been interviewed, what the outcome of the interview was or whether there
were additional openings for which the candidate might be considered. 95 Apart from evidencing

87 Jan. Tr. at 91-93, 126, 135, 162; Luyanda at 22; Maldonado at 47, 67; Padilla Sept. at 53, 70-71.
88 Luyanda at 22-23.
89 When responding to a vacancy notice, the Talent Bank did not generally send more than six to eight candidates. (Jan.
Tr. at 64-65.) Depending on the type of job, the Talent Bank might have less or more than six to eight candidates who might be
qualified.

90 Jan. Tr. at 162.
91 !Q. at 185. In addition, there was no code to identify Vietnam veterans, notwithstanding the announced policy to aid them
in obtaining positions. !Q. at 391.
92 Padilla Sept. at 70-71.
93 Jan. Tr. at 91, 93; Padilla Sept. at 53; Padilla Feb. at 122-23.
94 Jan. Tr. at 126, 185. According to Maldonado and Luyanda, however, candidates referred by the Mayor's Minority Affairs
and Hispanic Affairs Advisors were among the 'hot' candidates. Maldonado at 133; Luyanda at 14.
95 Jan. Tr. at 93-97, 100-01, 164-65; Luyanda at 35-36; Maldonado at 51-52; Padilla Sept. at 55, 58-59; Padilla Feb. at 12223.
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the importance DeVincenzo's office attached to referred candidates, these constant inquiries --which were frequently matters of urgency requiring immediate response --- disrupted the flow of
Talent Bank work. 96 As Padilla testified:
There wasn't a day that didn't go by where I didn't have to go
running around looking for somebody's resume, somebody who
had been referred by somebody important and I had to drop
everything to interview these people and I was harassed if they
didn't get referred to jobs they qualified for, even though they
might not have been appropriate for the job.97
Special efforts to obtain jobs for referred candidates were also made after
candidates had been sent to agencies. For example, Luyanda was told by Morales to try to
"push" referred candidates by requesting additional interviews for different vacancies for "hot"
candidates who had not initially been hired. 98 Following that direction, Luyanda would
sometimes seek to persuade agencies that the candidate was a very good one. 99 Padilla was
told to advise an agency that DeVincenzo would be upset if a candidate had not yet been hired
or interviewed. 100 One consequence of these efforts was, as Padilla testified, that agencies
sometimes believed she was trying to "push" a politically referred candidate when she was
actually emphasizing the qualifications of a candidate who was in fact a very good one. 101
Prior to the Talent Bank's move to 52 Chambers Street in February 1985, as
Schwartz's testimony establishes, politically referred candidates benefitted from similar forms of
preferential treatment. Lists of candidates, sometimes ordered in a specified priority, were
forwarded by Mayor's Office staff to agencies. 102 With respect to those lists containing priority
orderings of candidates, the high-priority candidates were referred by political figures. For

96 Luyanda ·at 36; Padilla Feb. at 122·23. For example, as Luyanda testified, the Talent Bank compu1er could not simultaneously search for information abou1 a candidate and perform its other functions. Accordingly, the constant requests from
DeVincenzo's office for information abou1 referred candidates created a backlog in other computer work. Jan. Tr. at 164-65.
97 Padilla Feb. at 122-23.
98 Jan. Tr. at 165-66.

99 Luyanda at 32.

100 Jan. Tr. at 102.
101 Padilla Sept. at 66.
102 April Tr. at 115-17, 125-26, 128-29. Testimony from employees of the Department of Environmental Protection and the
Department of Transportation, as well as ·documents obtained from these agencies, confirm this practice. See Sections II and Ill
below.

-.
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example, one list containing candidates referred by political figures and other sources, ranks the
politically referred candidates ahead of the other candidates. 103 And Schwartz sometimes
received from DeVincenzo letters sent by political figures containing lists of candidates that the
political figures themselves had ranked in priority order. Either these letters or lists
incorporating the priority ordering of the letters would then be forwarded to an agency. 104
Schwartz received instructions from DeVincenzo from time to time that certain
politically referred candidates had to be hired, should be pushed or reconsidered. 105 And as
Schwartz acknowledged, she would act on these instructions by telling agency personnel staff
that particular candidates were important, that they should do their best to hire them, that she
should be kept posted and by otherwise conveying that they should be hired. 106 Schwartz was
not aware of any candidate who was the subject of such efforts who did not obtain a job. 107
Correlatively, the comparative lack of attention paid to the Talent Bank's
affirmative action goals is exemplified by Schwartz's testimony that following up on priority list
candidates alone occupied a "couple of hours" of her time each day. 108 She was not aware of
any efforts made by persons under her to recruit candidates from minority, veterans or women's
organizations. 109

103 !Q at 128.
104 !Q. at 129-30.
105 !Q. at 117, 125, 139-40.
106 !Q. at 139-40.
107 !Q. at 144.
108 !Q. at 147.
109 !Q. at 149-50.
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4.

Laborer Positions

Among the titles of interest to the Mayor's Office were manual laborers' titles.
Many of the manual laborer positions in the City require few qualifications but pay well; some
in excess of $20,000 a year plus opportunities for overtime pay. Far from being open to all
City residents these jobs were, at least until 1986, largely the province of politically referred
candidates who were predominantly white males. DeVincenzo's office played a decisive role in
the process by which these jobs were dispensed.
When agencies, chiefly DEP and DOT, advised DeVincenzo's office of their
plans to hire laborers, Peter Gilvarry 110 would submit a handwritten list containing the names of
potential laborer candidates to DeVincenzo. The names on these lists were overwhelmingly
derived from political figures. On these lists, Gilvarry wrote only the names of the candidates
and their referral source. DeVincenzo, not the Talent Bank computer, then determined which
of the prospective candidates would be forwarded to the agency; the testimony indicates that
the Talent Bank's affirmative action goals played little if any role in this process. 111
G_ilvarry obtained the names of laborer candidates from a variety of sources:
letters from political figures, lists from the office of John LoCicero, the Mayor's special advisor,
the Talent Bank and non-political sources. The largest single source, however, was the letters
from political figures that were forwarded to Gilvarry by DeVincenzo. Neither these letters,
nor the lists that came from LoCicero's office contained any notations concerning the ethnicity
of the candidates. And Gilvarry correctly believed that the names on the lists sent by
LoCicero's office had in turn been .obtained from county leaders and other political figures. 112
The evidence also suggests that DeVincenzo determined which potential
candidates would be referred to agencies on the basis of political criteria. Most significantly,
apart from a candidate's name, referral source information was the only other information
Gilvarry recorded on the lists he submitted to DeVincenzo. 113

110 From January 1978 until mid-1985, when he assumed different responsibilities in City Hall, Peter Gilvarry was one of
the members of DeVincenzo's staff responsible for reviewing PARs submitted by mayoral agencies.
111 April Tr. at 256-61 .
112 jg.at257-58.
113 jg. at 258, 261.
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By 1983, if not earlier, LoCicero and his executive assistant, Jerry Skurnick,
regularly contacted the office of Democratic county leaders in Staten Island, Queens, Brooklyn,
and the Bronx and other political figures to invite them to submit names of candidates for
laborer positions. 114 Because the Manhattan Democratic County Leader was an opponent of
the Mayor, however, he was not invited to submit candidates. 115
Although LoCicero testified that he always asked county leaders to submit names
of minority candidates, he acknowledged that Skurnick was the one who generally contacted the
county leaders. Skurnick, who testified that increasing the number of women and minorities
was not a major component of the Talent Bank, acknowledged that he seldom asked the
representatives of the county leaders with whom he dealt to submit minority candidates. 116
Since these county leaders did not indicate the ethnicity of their candidates when they
submitted them, LoCicero and Skurnick had little means of ascertaining whether they were
submitting minority candidates. 117 And whatever efforts were made by LoCicero's office to
obtain candidates from political figures who were members of minority groups, they were clearly
insufficient to counter-balance the overwhelming numbers of white male candidates.
A 1978 mayoral directive sought to broaden the pool of applicants for City jobs
by requiring agencies to post all job vacancies. But, as discussed in Sections II and III below,
the two agencies hiring the largest number of laborers, DEP and DOT, did not comply with this
directive. Rather, compliance was waived by DeVincenzo's office. The candidates referred by
the Mayor's Office, accordingly, did not compete with the general public for these well-paid,
minimum skill jobs.

5.

"Special" Referrals

Even prior to the creation of the Talent Bank, DeVincenzo's office regularly
referred job candidates to agencies. Members of DeVincenzo's staff, particularly the aides who
assisted him in the exercise of his oversight authority over agency personnel actions, were
charged with the task of finding jobs for these candidates.

114 J.s!.. at 168.
115 J.s!.. at 174. In part for this reason, residents of Manhattan were drastically underrepresented in DEP's and DOT's laborer
work force.
116 April Tr. at 180, 207.
117 J.s!.. at 181 .
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From the time he first assumed responsibilities for PAR review, Peter Gilvarry
was given the additional responsibility of trying to find jobs for persons who were referred to
him by DeVincenzo. 118 The other members of DeVincenzo's staff doing PAR reviews, such as
Hein, also endeavored to find jobs for these "special" referrals. Indeed, Gilvarry and Hein
"worked" the same candidates; 119 Hein would seek to place them at the agencies whose PARs
he handled and Gilvarry at the agencies whose PARs he handled. These candidates, unlike
Talent Bank canqidates, were not referred to agencies in response to vacancy notices from the
agencies. Rather, they were generally forwarded for a wide variety of positions, including
laborer jobs, to the larger agencies; these agencies were usually under full capacity and thus
were able to accept candidates in positions for which they had not previously submitted vacancy
notices. 120
Gilvarry's efforts to place these candidates sometimes began when DeVincenzo
or another of his aides introduced him to a candidate sitting in the hall outside DeVincenzo's
office. 121 Otherwise, he received their resumes from DeVincenzo. If the particular positions
for which they were to be considered had not already been determined, DeVincenzo would
direct that the candidates be sent to Harry Shapiro. Shapiro would then interview the
candidate and determine the job titles for which he or she might be qualified. 122
Gilvarry generally knew the referral sources of these candidates and
acknowledged that at least some of them were referred by political figures. Gilvarry learned
the referral source either through a cover letter from a political figure accompanying the
resume or by being told the name of the political figure by the candidate. 123 Gilvarry knew
that others had been referred by LoCicero's office either on the basis of memos from
LoCicero's office accompanying resumes or subsequent inquiries concerning candidates from
LoCicero's office. With respect to these candidates, Gilvarry assumed that they had been

118

12·

at 255-57.

119 Gilvarry at 47·50, 288-89, 304--05.
120

12·

at 269-70.

121

12·

at 264.

122

12· at 263-65.

123

12· at 266-67.
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referred to LoCicero's office by political figures. 124 Gilvany tetained whatever information he
received or noted about the referral sources and so was able to respond to inquiries about the
status of candidates from DeVincenzo which were sometimes phrased in terms of the name of
the candidate's referral source rather than the name of the candidate. 125
DeVincenzo expected quick action on these "special" referrals. Indeed, partly on
the basis of receiving inquiries about their status from DeVincenzo so shortly after first
receiving them --- often within a day or two --- Gilvany felt pressure to place them. 126 During
the years in which he was performing PAR review, January 1978 to mid-1985, Gilvany
estimated that he received between 1 and 5 or 6 of these "special" referrals per month but
none in some months. 127
·
According to Gilvarry, he and Hein were generally successful in obtaining jobs
for these candidates. 128 Even if Gilvarry and Hein did not purposefully seek to push agencies
into hiring these candidates, their importance was certainly conveyed to agencies. 129 These
candidates, after all, were handled not by the Talent Bank staff but by DeVincenzo's PAR staff
and their status was regularly monitored. And, moreover, posting requirements were waived for
these candidates.

6.

The Ethnicity And Gender Of Talent Bank Hires

A comparison of the ethnicity and gender of the Talent Bank's placements with
the ethnicity and gender of discretionary City-wide hires is revealing. In fiscal year 1983-84,
48.7% of the City's discretionary hires were members of minority groups as compared to 39.5%

124 April Tr. at 256-57.
125 Gilvarry at 301, 309· 11.
126 !.£. at 301. Padilla and Ellin Hauser, a Mayor's Office employee who was charged with overall responsibility for the
Talent Bank for a four· or five-month period in late 1986 and early 1987, testified to feeling similarly pressured by inquiries from
DeVincenzo and members of his staff about candidates who they had met or whose resumes they had received just a day or two
before.
127 Gilvarry at 263, 288. The personnel staff at DEP who regularly handled these 'specials,' the term by which they referred
to them, estimated that DEP received an average of five per month (See n. 235 below). DOT officials estimated that they received
anywhere from a 'couple' to as many as ten each month. See n. 316 below.
1213 Gilvarry at 269.

129 Testimony from DEP personnel regarding their perception of the possible consequences of not hiring City Hall candidates
is discussed in Section II, below.
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of the Talent Bank's placements (145 of 367); in fiscal year 1984-85, 51.6% of the City's
discretionary hires were minorities compared to 50.3% of the Talent Bank's placements (238 of
473); and in fiscal year 1985-86, 54.3% of the City's discretionary hires were minorities
compared to 51.2% of the Talent Bank's placements (208 of 406). Similarly, in fiscal year
1983-84, 46% of the City's discretionary hires were women compared to 26.7% of the Talent
Bank's placements (98 of 367); in fiscal year 1984-85, 45.3% of the City's discretionary hires
were women compared to 27.3% of the Talent Bank's placements (129 of 473); and in fiscal
year 1985-86, 46.5% of the City's discre~ionary hires were women compared to 35.5% of the
Taler.t Bank's placements (144 of 406). 130
Notwithstanding that a major objective of the Talent Bank was to promote the
hiring of minorities and women, it did not do as well as the City as a whole in each of these
years. 131

D.

The Purging Of Referral Source
Information From The Talent Bank

The sworn testimony of Padilla, Maldonado and Luyanda, corroborated by
documents and the sworn testimony of others, establishes that on a day either in late January
or early February of 1986, the Talent Bank's files and computers were purged of all records
revealing the referral source of Talent Bank candidates. Led by Hein, Talent Bank staff and
other members of DeVincenzo's staff destroyed documents indicating the referral source of
Talent Bank candidates, removed the referral source codes from the Talent Bank computer and
thereby at~empted to eliminate any evidence suggesting that the Talent Bank gave preferential
treatment to politically referred candidates.
Before nine o'clock that morning, Hein telephoned Padilla telling her to "drop
everything" and that it was a "top priority" to remove all source references from the Talent
Bank. 132 After leaving a message for Morales, the Talent Bank's coordinator, to the effect that
she had to speak with her, Padilla left for a meeting. 133 When Padilla arrived at the Talent

130 Charts and statistical tabulations relating to these placement statistics are collected in Attachment F.
131 As noted below, the Talent Bank"s referrals for laborer positions at DEP and DOT in the years 1984 and 1985 resulted
in these positions being filled overwhelmingly by white males. See Attachments G (DEP) and H (DOT) for the relevant statistical
breakdowns.
132 Jan. Tr. at 111 .

133

ls!·
'•
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Bank later that morning, the work had already begun. 134

·-

When he arrived at the Talent Bank that morning, Hein appeared upset 135 and,
after speaking privately with Morales, told the Talent Bank staff, including Morales, Luyanda,
Maldonado, Williams and others, that they were to stop what they were doing and go through
the Talent Bank files and remove all documents which made reference to referral source. 136
Luyanda recalled further instructions from Morales that they were to "destroy all incriminating
evidence that would point out that there had been political referrals being made and that
special preference was given to those people." 137
The staff, accordingly, spent the entire working day going through files, teai-ing
up and throwing out all documents containing indicia of referral sources, including cover letters,
resume cover sheets and, in some cases, resumes. 138
The colored file folders, used to distinguish candidates on the basis of their
referral source, were also tom up and discarded, 139 but Hein directed the staff to check with
him or Morales before destroying the contents of the red folders signifying the particularly "hot"
referrals. 140
The door to the Talent Bank was kept closed and, at times, locked. 141 Access
to the Talent Bank was restricted and a special knock used to gain entry. 142 Ellin Hauser, a

134 !Q. at 112·13.
135 Maldonado at 96.
136 !Q. at 97-99.
137 Luyanda at 41 .
138 Jan. Tr. at 113, 171-72. Some of the resumes in the files bore handwritten notations of the referral source. (Maldonado
at 124.) These resumes were thrown out after the Talent Bank staff made copies, cleansed of the referral source notations. !Q.
139 Jan. Tr. at 113, 171-72, 174.
140 Maldonado at 103. Because of the volume of red folders, however, they were put aside by the staff and Hein and
Morales reviewed them before destroying documents in the red folders. !Q. at 103-05.
141 Jan. Tr. at 112, 186.
142 !Q. at 186.
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Mayor's Office employee, entered the Talent Bank that day but was ordered out by Hein. 143
Before leaving, Hauser saw Talent Bank staff ripping up folders and heard someone in the
room ask how she had gained admittance, commenting that Hauser had not used "the knock." 144
Referral source information was also removed from the Talent Bank computer
that day. Padilla, Maldonado and Luyanda all testified that Helen Mosley, the computer
specialist who had programmed the Talent Bank computer, spent at least several hours in the
Talent Bank that day removing referral source data from the computer. 145 Hein testified that
he asked Mosley to delete referral source information from the computer. 146
Files in at least one other office were also searched for referral source materials
that day. Harry Shapiro, who evaluated and classified resumes of Talent Bank candidates, had
a nearby office in 52 Chambers Street. His files, according to Maldonado who had previously
been his secretary, contained resumes and other materials rel~ting to candidates he had
personally interviewed. 147 Maldonado recalled that someone searched Shapiro's files, removed
some documents from the files and brought them into the Talent Bank where they were
deposited into one of several plastic garbage bags that were used to discard Talent Bank
referral source records. 148 Barry Skolnick, who shared Shapiro's office, also testified that Hein
went into the office and examined Shapiro's resume files; he stated that he was not sure,
however, whether Hein or anyone else removed any of Shapiro's files. 149
Hein also directed Padilla to remove from her office all materials containing

143 Hauser at 69-70.
144 !.Q. at 70.
145 Jan. Tr. at 115-16, 175; Maldonado at 122.
146 Jan. Tr. at 396. Although Mosley acknowledged that Hein asked her to delete referral source information from the
computer and that she spent several hours working on the computer she testified that she did not remove all of the referral source
data from the computer. (April Tr. at 342-46; Mosley at 175-76.) Rather, Mosley testified that she altered the referral source
information, changing the names of the sources into four-letter abbreviations of their names. (April Tr. at 344.) Copies of the
Talent Bank computer printouts in the Commission's possession that were generated at least several weeks before the day Talent
Bank records were destroyed, however, contain these abbreviations. (Attachment I.) Furthermore, Padilla and Maldonado testified
that the abbreviation codes for referral sources were used long before that day. (Padilla Sept. at 22-24; Maldonado 80-82.)
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that all referral source information was removed from the Talent Bank computer as well
as from its files on the day in question.

147 Maldonado at 118.
148 !.Q. at 118-20.
149 Skolnick at 111-12, 166-67, 169-71 .
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referral source information. 150 Because she was further instru~ted not to throw such materials
into the office trash, she took home with her the Black Book, Talent Bank computer printouts
and other documents. 151
The purging of the Talent Bank's files and computer took up the entire day and
continued into the evening. 152 The garbage bags containing referral source materials were
taken out of the Talent Bank during the course of the day and put into Rein's car. In his
public testimony, Hein stated that he took the garbage bags home to Yonkers with him because
trash was not scheduled to be picked up until the next day and due to "the sensitivity and the
amount of the stuff in the bags, I did not want those papers flying all over Chambers Street the
next morning." 153
Regardless of what may have prompted the purging of referral source documents,
it was initiated by DeVincenzo. In his public testimony, Hein stated that DeVincenzo initiated
it by telling him, in substance, to "make sure that the Talent Bank doesn't have any referral
sources in it." 154 Although Hein also testified that he did not discuss the removal of source
documents with DeVincenzo during the course of the day, 155 Maldonado testified that she
recalled Hein receiving a phone call from DeVincenzo in the morning and that Hein was called
out of the Talent Bank in the afternoon to speak with DeVincenzo. 156 Padilla, moreover,
testified that she overheard Hein giving a status report over the telephone on the progress of
the efforts to remove source material and that Hein told her he had been speaking to
DeVincenzo after he hung up the telephone. 157
Those who assisted in the destruction of referral source materials were instructed
150 Jan. Tr. at 118.
151 Id. at 118-19. There is also evidence, albeit inconclusive, that documents in Room 1 in City Hall were also discarded
that day. l.uyanda testified that Monica Fung, a Mayor's Office employee who worked in Room 1, was present in the Talent
Bank that day and, referring to the destruction of documents in the Talent Bank, said 'ti you think its bad here, you should see
over at City Hall, it's chaos.' Jan. Tr. at 174. ·

152 Jan. Tr. at 116; Luyanda at 44.
153 Jan. Tr. at 425. Similarly, Maldonado recalled that Hein stated that the garbage bags should not be disposed of at 52
Chambers Street explaining that he was concerned reporters might go through the garbage. Maldonado at 115-16.

154 Jan. Tr. at 435.
155

!£. at 429

156 Maldonado at 109-10.
157 Jan. Tr. at 116-17.
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not to speak of the events of that day. Maldonado testified that Hein said they should "leave
that day, like, off the record, not to mention it at all, a day like it never happened." 158
Luyanda recalled that Morales advised her the next day not to mention anything about the
events of the preceding day explaining that if anyone found out the Talent Bank would be shut
down and the staff would lose their jobs. 159 Regardless of whether Hein or Morales were the
individuals who instructed the participants to deny the events of that day, such instructions were
given and followed by several of the participants, including when they were questioned under
oath by the Com.mission.
The destruction of Talent Bank documents containing referral source information
was not part of a regular practice designed to keep Talent Bank files up-to-date. Rein's public
testimony that stale resumes (~ ones more than six months old) were purged from the files,
as they had been in the past, along with referral source documents, 160 is at odds with the
testimony of Padilla, Maldonado and Luyanda. Maldonado testified that the destruction of
Talent Bank records that day was not related in any way to any practice of removing stale
resumes from the files and that efforts to remove stale resumes did not begin until the latter
part of 1986. 161 Similarly, Luyanda testified that she did not recall any regular cleaning out of
old resumes occurring prior to the destruction of referral source materials. 162 And Padilla
testified that although there was a "theoretical[]" policy to get rid of stale resumes, old resumes
were never thrown out but rather were retained in an inactive file. 163
Other evidence before the Commission suggests that old resumes were not
thrown out and that the Talent Bank's efforts to update files were desultory even after early
1986. Charles Miller, a public records officer for ·the Ne~ York City Department of Records
and Information Services, conducted a survey of Talent Bank records over the course of several
months beginning in November, 1987. 164 Among the records Miller surveyed were six cubic

158 Maldonado at 117-18.
159 Jan. Tr. at 1n; Luyanda at 51-52.
160 Jan. Tr. 423-24, 431-34.
161

Maldonado at 126-28.

162 Luyanda at 48-49.
163 Jan. Tr. at 125; Padilla Sept. at 47-48.
164 Miller at 2-4.

-.
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feet of folders relating to inactive Talent Bank candidates dating back to 1985. 165 In a written
"Recommendation Statement," moreover, Miller recommended that closed candidate folders be
"weeded out twice annually." In his conversations with Talent Bank staff, Miller was never told
that the Talent Bank was already weeding out inactive folders on a regular basis. 166
Salvatore Salamone, the Director of Management Information Systems at the
Department of General Services, began an audit of the Talent Bank in the late spring or early
summer of 1987 at DeVincenw's request. 167 On the basis of some twelve to fifteen meetings
with Hein, Padilla and others he prepared a "Top/Down Analysis" of the Talent Bank. 168 In his
analysis, Salamone identified a number of items that Hein, Padilla and the others all agreed
were problems at the Talent Bank. 169 One such problem was "We don't purge files systematically."170 Salamone was never told during the course of his meetings with Talent Bank staff
that the Talent Bank had any policy with respect to purging files. 171

E.

The Talent Bank's Improved Affirmative Action Performance

In part as a result of changes in the procedures by which the Talent Bank
obtained and referred candidates for laborer positions and changes in the procedures by which
agencies hired laborers, the Talent Bank's affirmative action performance began to improve in
1986. In fiscal years 1983-84, 1984-85 and 1985-86, as previously noted, the Talent Bank's
placements reflect a lower percentage of women and minorities hired than the percentage of
women and minorities hired in these years by the City as a whole. 172 But in fiscal year 198687, for the first time, the Talent Bank's minority placement performance exceeded that of the
City. In this year, 68.3% of the Talent Bank's placements were members of minority groups as
compared with the 58.5% of the City's discretionary hires who were members of minority
165 !.Q.

at

7-9.

166

Miller at

167

Salamone at 3-4,

12-13.
6.

168 !.Q. at 11-14, 20.
169 !.Q. at 12-13, 31 .
170 !.Q. at 37.
171 !.Q.
172

at 38.

See the comparison set forth at pages

26-27

above.
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groups.173
Changes in Talent Bank procedures relating to laborer hiring were prompted
when First Deputy Mayor Brezenoff learned in late 1984 or early 1985, but in any event riot
later than February 1985, that a disproportionate number of white males had been getting
laborer jobs paying in excess of $20,000. 174 DeVincenzo informed Brezenoff that the overrepresentation of white males was "attributable in part because of the nature of the referrals
which were coming very heavily from elected and political officials and unions and Vietnam
veterans ..... "175 More specifically, Brezenoff learned that the majority of laborer referrals were
coming from county leaders. 176
Brezenoff, accordingly, instructed DeVincenzo to take a number of steps to
improve the placement of minorities and women. He directed DeVincenzo to increase his
efforts at expanding the Talent Bank's referral sources by using TAP centers, women's
organizations and the Mayor's Advisors for Black and Hispanic Affairs. 177 He also told
DeVincenzo to tell the Talent Bank's existing referral sources, including county leaders, that
they would have a better chance of obtaining jobs for their nominees if they were minorities or
women. 178
By the summer of 1986, however, Brezenoff had concluded that insufficient
progress had resulted from these steps and determined, with the concurrence of the Mayor, to
take "fundamental action." 179 The Talent Bank thus became, around August of 1986, the
exclusive source for laborer candidates and agencies were required to hire only from lists of
· candidates provided by the Talent Bank. 180

173

The Talent Bank's placement of women, however, continued to lag behind the City in fiscal year
Attachment F.
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April Tr. at

476-77;
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April Tr. at

477.
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April Tr. at

478-79.
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April Tr. at

475-80;
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April Tr. at

480;
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April Tr. at

475.
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April Tr. at
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Brezenoff at

61-62, 79-83, 119-20.
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1986-87.

See

Mayor Koch did not learn from Brezenoff until"sometime in 1986 "that a
disproportionate number of the laborers hired through the Talent Bank were white males," 181
that "laborer jobs, in large numbers, not exclusively, were filled by having calls made to political
leaders to tell them there were jobs available" 182 or that LoCicero had been making such
calls. 183 In early 1987, Mayor Koch directed another change: the implementation of a lottery
system for the selection of the Talent Bank laborer candidates who would be forwarded to
agencies when agencies planned to hire laborers. 184
Apart from these changes relating to laborer po~itions, the Talent Bank changed
in other ways in 1986. Following the destruction of records in early 1986, referral source
information was no longer stored in the Talent Bank computer or in the individual candidate
files. 185 And Padilla observed a greater concern on DeVincenzo's part about the placement of
women and members of minority groups through the Talent Bank. 186
I •

I

F.

The Role Of Joseph DeVincenzo

Joseph DeVincenzo's dominant role in the patronage operations described above
is established by the overwhelming weight of the evidence. His role is important to understand
because he reported directly to Deputy Mayor Brezenoff, maintained close communication with
the Mayor's Special Advisor John LoCicero, and exercised authority legally vested in the Mayor
and delegated to him as a subordinate of the Mayor.
The copies of the Talent Bank computer printouts furnished to the Commission
by Schwartz and Padilla establish that the Talent Bank systematically recorded the referral

181 April Tr. at 557.
182 Koch at 74.
183 April Tr. at 565-66.
184 April Tr. at 487-88, 566.
185 Talent Bank staff, however, were expected to keep track informally of referral sources. (Jan. Tr. at 122; Padilla Feb. at ·
53-54; Luyanda at 52.) Padilla was obliged to continue to report to DeVincenzo on the status and progress of particular
candidates. (Jan. Tr. at 121-22.) While pressure from DeVincenzo's office to place 'specials' subsided following the purging of
source documents, Padilla testified that by 1987 it had returned. (Jan. Tr. at 140-41; Padilla Feb. at 54-55.) Ellin Hauser also
testified that during the period in which she was in charge of the Talent Bank (late 1987 and early 1988), a great deal of her day
was spent interviewing 'specials' sent to her by DeVincenzo and members of his staff. (Hauser at 189-90.) In abou1 May, 1987,
DeVincenzo suggested to Padilla and others that referral source information be pu1 back into the compu1er. Jan. Tr. at 141.
186 Padilla Feb. at 107; Padilla Sept. at 90-91.
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source of its candidates. The testimony of Padilla, Moffit, Mosley and others establish the
existence of source information in the Talent Bank's computer and demonstrate DeVincenzo's
knowledge of its existence. His top aides would not have undertaken on their own initiative to
develop and operate Talent Bank computer systems containing such significant information as
the political referral source of candidates.
The resume cover sheets that Schwartz provided to the Commission establish
that source information was integral to the Talent Bank's operation. They too spell out
DeVincenzo's role in its operation. Several of them contain instructions and notations from
DeVincenzo in his own handwriting. 187 It is improbable that in reviewing these forms and
writing these messages on them DeVincenzo could have failed to notice their "Source" space,
particularly given its prominence on the forms.
DeVincenzo's testimony that he accorded no preferences to candidates on the
basis of political considerations is contradicted by other documents obtained from Schwartz.
Various of these documents reflect determinations about the relative priorities to be accorded
candidates referred by political figures and instructions that such candidates "must be hired,"
"pushed" or otherwise placed. Schwartz testified that DeVincenzo, not she, made these
determinations and delivered these instructions and it is unlikely that a low-level City Hall
employee could have been in a position to assess such political priorities and issue such
directions.
DeVincenzo's testimony that he either threw out or forwarded to LoCicero's
office any letters he received from political figures referring job candidates is also contradicted
by the documents in Schwartz's files. Her files contained more than thirty letters addressed to
DeVincenzo or members of his staff from political figures referring job candidates. Schwartz
testified that letters from political figures referring candidates and other documents disclosing
the referral source of candidates were routinely forwarded to her by DeVincenzo. 188
Finally, the evidence established that DeVincenzo played a supervisory role in
the early 1986 destruction of records. Hein did not act on his own initiative in directing this
urgent and secret operation. In fact, Hein testified that DeVincenzo initiated the operation by
instructing him to make sure that the Talent Bank's records contained no referral sources. 189
And Padilla testified that she overheard Hein's end of a telephone conversation that day

187 April Tr. at 113-15.

See,~. Attachment E.

188 April Tr. at 136-37.
189 Jan. Tr. at 429, 435.
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between Hein and DeVincenzo in which Hein reported on the status of the operation.

190 Jan. Tr. at 116-17.
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II

THE MAYOR'S OFFICE AND THE
PERSONNEL PRACTICES OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

During the period 1983-86, candidates referred by the Mayor's Office to the
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") enjoyed numerous advantages over other
candidates for jobs. Although precise figures cannot be determined, at least a substantial
portion of Mayor's Office candidates were persons who had been referred by political figures.
At times, various forms of pressure were brought to bear on DEP to hire these candidates and
the oversight authority that DeVincenzo's office exercised over DEP's personnel actions played
a key role in the placement of candidates referred by the M ayor's Office.

A.

The Mayor's Office's Authority Over DEP Laborer Hiring

As DEP records establish, it hired some 197 laborers in 1984 and 1985. 191
·Tuese positions paid well in excess of $20,000 and offered opportunities for overtime. 192 In
theory, these jobs were open to all New York City residents who could pass a medical
examination and possessed a valid driver's license. 193 However, although a mayoral directive
required that all job vacancies be posted, DEP did not post laborer vacancies. 194 Nor did it
advertise their existence. 195 Rather, DEP notified only DeVincenzo's office when it planned to
hire laborers. 196 Sherri Roth and Marlene Hochstadt, currently Deputy Directors of Personnel
at DEP, estimated that the overwhelming majority --- perhaps more than 90% --- of all laborer
hires in the 1983-85 period were Mayor's Office referrals. 197 And all laborers hired were

191

See also Jan. Tr. at 194; Roth at 62-63.

192 Jan. Tr. at 194; Hochstadt at 13-14.
193 Jan. Tr. at 195; Roth at 71; Hochstadt at 13.
194 Jan. Tr. at 208; Roth at 14, 15, 30; Hochstadt at 21-22, 96.
195 Jan. Tr. at 208; Roth at 30; Hochstadt at 22.
196 Jan. Tr. at 195; Roth at 14; Hochstadt at 18.
197 Jan. Tr. at 204; Roth at 42, 53, 63 ; Hochstadt at 28-30, 60 .

..
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subject to prior approval by DeVincenzo's office. 198 Accordingly, as a practical matter, referral
by the Mayor's Office ·was an additional requirement for a laborer job at DEP.
After DEP notified DeVincenzo's office of its intention to hire laborers, DEP's
personnel staff received lists of candidates from DeVincenzo's office. 199 Sometimes one list was
sent; sometimes a number of smaller lists were sent. 200 At times, these lists bore notations
indicating the names of the political figures who had referred the candidates. 201 Less
frequently, DeVincenzo's office also transmitted the names of candidates by simply forwarding
to DEP letters from political figures and union representatives addressed to DeVincenzo or
other Mayor's Office staff that contained listings of laborer candidates. 202 Even when
documents from the Mayor's Office did not indicate the names of the political figures who had
referred candidates to the Mayor's Office, Roth and Hochstadt --- the DEP employees who
regularly received and handled these lists --- sometimes learned the source of individual
candidates from Fred Carfora, the then Deputy Commissioner for Administration at DEP. 203
Roth and Hochstadt would then record the source on the list or elsewhere. 204
According to Roth and Hochstadt, they did not always know who had first
referred particular candidates to the Mayor's Office, nor did they think it important to know:
what was important was that these candidates were the Mayor's Office's candidates. 205 Roth,
Hochstadt and others at DEP, however, believed that the Mayor's Office's candidates were
predominantly those first referred by political figures. 206

198 Jean at 91.
199 Jan. Tr. at 196-97; Roth at 11-14, 20-21, 24-26; Hochstadt at 36-37.
200 Jan. Tr. at 197; Roth at 16, 24.
201

Jan. Tr. at 199-200, 250-51; Roth at 20-21, 83-84; Hochstadt at 50.

202 Jan. Tr. at 198-99, 248-50; Roth at 24.
203 Jan. Tr. at 200; Roth at 20-21; Hochstadt at 56. When Carfora apprised them of the source of particular candidates, the
source was a political figure. Roth at 21-23.
204 Roth at 21-22.
205 Jan. Tr. at 346-47; Roth at 20-21 ; Hochstadt at 50-53.
206 Jan. Tr. at 254-55, 306-07 ; Hochstadt at 50-53, 204-05.
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Candidates were individually interviewed for laborer positions at periodically
conducted "pools," or mass interview sessions. 207 Although the vast majority of candidates were
Mayor's Office referrals, some arrived at the pools by other routes, including candidates
referred directly to DEP by political figures; candidates referred by Vincent Parisi, a
representative of District Council 37; and DEP "internals," candidates referred by DEP
employees or who were themselves DEP employees seeking to obtain higher-paying laborer
jobs. 208 People who were not referred by one of these routes, but who merely sent letters to
DEP asking to be considered for laborer jobs, were not interviewed. 209
At the hiring pools, all candidates were interviewed by DEP personnel staff and
representative~ of the particular DEP bureaus seeking to fill vacancies. 210 The candidates were
rated on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 the highest. A score of 5 was the usual cutoff point;
candidates rated below 5 were not hired and candidates who were rated 5 and above generally
were hired. 211
Candidates who were not referred by the Mayor's Office, but who were
interviewed and rated anyway, had no real chance of obtaining jobs because the hiring of such a
candidate was rarely approved. 212 Rather, as demonstrated by DEP documents and the
testimony of Roth and Carfora, DEP's regular practice was to hire only the Mayor's Office
candidates. If the number of acceptable Mayor's Office candidates was insufficient to fill all the
existing laborer vacancies, the excess vacancies remained unfilled until the Mayor's Office
supplied additional candidates who were interviewed individually or at subsequent pools. 213
A June 1985 memorandum from Hochstadt to Carfora concerning a laborer pool
conducted on June 5, 1985 illustrates this practice. DEP interviewed candidates for 35
vacancies. Of the 31 Mayor's Office candidates interviewed, 18 were selected. DEP "felt

207 Jan. Tr. at 197.
208 Jan . Tr. at 198, 201, 211, 303; Hochstadt at 23, 32, 59, 61-62; Roth at 28, 32-33, 42, 53-54, 58 .
209 Jan. Tr. at 202; Roth at 29, 31 .
21 O Jan. Tr. at 208; Roth at 37-38; Hochstadt at 64.

2 11 Jan. Tr. at 209; Roth at 38-39; Hochstadt at 65-66.
212 Jan. Tr. at 206, 333-34; Hochstadt at 60-63; Roth at 53, 63. Indeed, Hochstadt testified that she could not recall any
instances in which the requisite approval to hire a non-Mayor's Office candidate was obtained from DeVincenzo's office. Hochstadt
at 62-63.

..

213 Jan. Tr. at 204-06, 314-15; Roth at 55-56, 86 .
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obligated" to interview 14 candidates referred directly to it by elected officials and 12 of them
were found acceptable. However, these 12 candidates were not hired even though they were
qualified. Instead, Mayor's Office candidates with relatively low ratings were hired over other
candidates with higher ratings. 214
After pools were conducted, DEP apprised members of DeVincenzo's staff which
Mayor's Office candidates had been accepted and which rejected. 215 Various efforts to "push"
one or more of the rejected candidates followed every pool. 216 Members of DeVincenzo's staff
sought explanations of the reasons why particular candidates had not been selected, explaining
at times that DeVincenzo wanted to know or that DeVincenzo was very interested in the
particular candidate. 217 Hochstadt, Roth and others provided the explanations, either
immediately on the basis of their records or after checking with the representatives of the DEP
bureaus who had interviewed the candidates. 218 These explanations were rarely sufficient. 219
Sometimes within twenty minutes of providing an explanation, members of
DeVincenzo's office (including Schwartz, Gilvarry and Hein) would either call back and say that
the reasons were not good enough or that they were under pressure from DeVincenzo, or
otherwise communicate a request that the rejected candidate be reconsidered. 220
Hochstadt and Roth, accordingly, were obliged to contact the relevant DEP
bureau. They would explain that the Mayor's Office was pushing a particular candidate and
either ask for more information or request that the candidate be accepted. 221 Depending upon
the bureau's response, second and third telephone calls between DeVincenzo's office and DEP's
personnel staff might follow. 222 These efforts sometimes but not always resulted in the hiring

214 Jan. Tr. at 217-18; Hochstadt at 84; Roth at 85-86.
215 Jan. Tr. at 212-13; Roth at 36; Hochstadt at 71 .
216 Jan. Tr. at 212·14; Roth at 36, 43-44; Hochstadt at 72-74.
217 Jan. Tr. at 212-15; Roth at 36, 44-45; Hochstadt at 71 , 75.
218 Jan . Tr. at 213; Roth at 36; Hochstadt at 75-76.
219 Jan. Tr. at 213; Roth at 49-51.
220 Jan. Tr. at 213-15; Roth at 49-51; Hochstadt at 76-77.
221

Jan. Tr. at 216 ; Roth at 46-49, 52 ; Hochstadt at 78, 82-83.

222 Roth at 36-37, 39-40.
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of a previously rejected candidate. 223 Occasionally, moreover, Hochstadt and Roth would learn
from Carfora that a Mayor's Office candidate who had not been acceptable to the bureau was
acceptable or was to be scheduled for a medical examination, a prerequisite for employment. 224
Accordingly, they believed that persons above them at DEP had been contacted by DeVincenzo
or his staff in continuing efforts to get jobs for candidates who were apparently of particular
importance to the Mayor's Office. 225
The rating process was also influenced by the Mayor's Office. Because it was
difficult to defend a decision not to select a marginally rated Mayor's Office candidate, DEP
regularly adjusted the ratings of those Mayor's Office candidates who received a marginal rating.
Thus, a candidate who had been rated a "5" might have his rating adjusted down to a "4" and
be rejected or up to a "6" and be accepted. In this manner, DEP sought both to preempt
efforts from DeVincenzo's office to push rejected Mayor's Office candidates and to enhance its
ability to respond to such efforts. 226
Although DEP did not post or advertise laborer vacancies, some members of the
general public became aware of vacancies nonetheless. In addition to those who wrote letters
to DEP, 227 interested persons came to DEP's offices several times a month. 228 Cassandra
Kennedy, an employee of DEP's Recruitment Unit, received inquiries from persons who walked
in off the street. 229 Knowing that it was pointless for her to do so, Kennedy explained that she
could not accept their names or resumes. 230 Although she was uncertain about whether she
should tell them the truth, Kennedy advised them to try to obtain a letter of reference from a

223 Jan. Tr. at 216-17; Roth at 38-40, 50; Hochstadt at 78-79, 83-84.
224

Jan. Tr. at 216-17; Roth at 45, 49-50; Hochstadt at 78-79.

225 !Q. Members of OeVincenzo's staff also telephoned DEP to provide names of candidates both before and after hiring
pools were conducted. (Jan . Tr. at 197, 221; Roth at 18, 27.) Candidates whose names were thus obtained after pools were
sometimes interviewed by Hochstadt or Roth. (Jan. Tr. at 221; Roth at 57-58.) Like the candidates interviewed at the hiring pools,
some of these candidates were 'pushed' by OeVincenzo's office. Jan. Tr. at 221; Roth at 57-58.
226 Jan. Tr. at 210-11; Roth at 40-43.
227 Persons who wrote letters to DEP inquiring about laborer vacancies received a letter stating that their names would be
kept on file. They did not obtain interviews. Jan . Tr. at 202; Roth at 28-30.
228 Kennedy at 16, 19.
229 !Q.
230 !Q. at 17-18.
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political source and hand-deliver the letter to Room 1 in City HaJJ. 231 The general response to
her advice was a comment to the effect that "oh, so this is a politica1 thing." 232
DEP employees noted that the Mayor's Office's laborer candidates reflected a
low percentage of women and minorities, and a high number of Staten Island residents. 233
DEP personnel records concerning its 197 laborer hires in 1984 and 1985 demonstrate the
accuracy of these perceptions. In 1984, approximately 69% of DEP's laborer hires were white
males, 29% were minority males and females, 31 % were Staten Island residents and 5% were
Manhattan residents. Similarly, in 1985 approximately 65% of DEP's laborer hires were white
males, 34% were minority males and females, 22% were Staten Island residents and 6% were
Manhattan residents. 234

'•
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B.

"City Hall Specials" ·

I

r~
i

As often as five times a month, DEP received "special" referrals from

DeVincenzo's office. 235 Unlike Talent Bank or laborer candidates, these referrals were not sent
in response to specific vacancy notices posted by DEP. 236 Rather, they were candidates for
whom DEP sought to find vacancies. 237 DEP was generally understaffed and thus able to hire
these "City Hall specials" (as they were referred to by DEP personnel staff) to fill vacancies
that had not previously been posted, either because there were no immediate plans to fill the
vacancies or because they had not gotten around to posting the vacancy notices. 238 Since DEP
was not required to post the vacancies for which "City Hall specials" were considered, the
"specials" did not have to compete for these vacancies with other candidates. 239

231

!Q. at 17-18, 33.

232 !Q. at 19.
233 Jan. Tr. at 218, 289; Roth at 74-75; Kennedy at 27-28.

234 For a more detailed analysis, see Attachment G.
235 Jan. Tr. at 223; Roth at 106.
236

Jan. Tr. at 222; Roth at 96; Hochstadt at 107.

23 7 Jan. Tr. at 224; Roth at 123-24.
238 Jan. Tr. at 227; Roth at 119-20; Hochstadt at 107-08.
239

Jan. Tr. at 228-29; Roth at 116, 119-21; Hochstadt at 108-09.
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Some "City Hall specials" --- those who were referred to DEP but not for a
specific position --- enjoyed an additional advantage. DEP's personnel staff would interview
these candidates or evaluate their resumes, or both, to determine the job titles for which they
would be qualified. 240 In this evaluation process, the salary that the "special" was looking for
was sometimes crucial. 241 DEP's staff would endeavor to find a job title for which they were
qualified and which paid a salary commensurate with the amount sought by the "City H all speciaJ."242

In contrast, no such attention was devoted to_the members of the general public
who, without specifying a particular position, mailed their resumes to DEP seeking employment.
DEP received up to 500 resumes a week in the mail and roughly half of these resumes were
not sent in response to vacancies posted or advertised by DEP. 243 Rather, they were sent by
people who expressed a general interest in obtaining employment at DEP. 244 Because of the
volume of these resumes, DEP's small personnel staff could do little more than place them in
an inactive file after mailing letters advising that their resumes would be kept on file. 245
Some "City Hall specials" were pushed by DeVincenzo's office more than
246
others.
Roth and Hochstadt were told by Hein, Gilvarry, Schwartz and others that particular
candidates ~ere "hot," "high priority" or "important."247 These candidates were the subjects of
frequent follow-up calls. 248 Members of DeVincenzo's staff would seek to learn the status of
"City Hall specials" (U, whether they had been interviewed yet, when they would be
interviewed, what the results of interviews were) and sometimes explained that DeVincenzo
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17.

at

17.

wanted to know or that they were being pressured by DeVince~zo. 249 Gilvarry, in particular,
would sometimes sound distraught when inquiring about the status of a referral. 250 The
importance of certain "City Hall specials" was also communicated by the frequency of telephone
requests for updates on their status. 251 For example, the same candidate might be the subject
of more than one status request on the same day or status requests on successive days.252
In addition to Hochstadt and Roth, Carfora also received resumes or other
information relating to "City Hall specials" from DeVincenzo's office. 253 At times in a
distraught tone, Carfora would tell DEP personnel staff that he was getting a "lot of heat," or
pressure about a particular candidate, that the candidate should be shopped around to the
various bureaus or that a job should be found for the candidate. 254 At times, DEP's personnel
staff would be obliged to drop their other work and attend to the process of finding jobs for
these candidates. 255
If a "special" was interviewed by a DEP bureau but the bureau did not want to
hire the candidate, additional interviews at other bureaus or at the same bureau for the same or
different positions would be arranged. 256 Less frequently, members of DeVincenzo's staff would
question or reject the reason why a bureau did not want to hire a candidate. 257 And at least
on some occasions, the bureau would then agree to hire the candidate.258

249 Jan. Tr. at 224; Hochstadt at 99-100, 102-03, 111·12, 120-21 .
250 Jan . Tr. at 224-25; Roth at 101.
251

Hochstadt at 101, 216-17.

252 Hochstadt at 101-02, 217-18.
253 Hochstadt at 100, 113; Martin at 34-35; (Roger Martin was the DEP Personnel Director from 1983 to 1985.) Roth at 96,
110-11.
254 Jan. Tr. at 224-25, 280-81; Hochstadt at 113; Martin at 34·35; Roth at 101 , 103.
255 Sullivan at 27.
256 Jan. Tr. at 231, 233; Hochstadt at 104-05, 107; Roth at 111 .
257 Hochstadt at 103-04; Roth at 109-10.
258 Hochstadt at 104·05; Roth at 112-13.
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If not as a result of the first interview, then as a result of second or third
interviews, "City Hall specials" were hired by DEP. 259 Indeed, except for occasional instances in
which a "special" was hired by another agency, Roth could not recall a single instance in which
a position was not found for the heavily pushed "specials" at DEP. 260

Talent Bank Candidates

C.

Talent Bank candidates were also pushed by the Mayor's Office. 261 Cassandra
Kennedy, who acted as DEP's liaison with the Talent Bank, regularly received telephone calls
from Talent Bank staff seeking additional interviews for their candidates and she was often told
that particular candidates were "hot" or "special." 262 Like "City Hall specials," the status of
some Talent Bank candidates was frequently monitored, and Talent Bank staff sometimes
explained that DeVincenzo wanted the information or that they were under pressure to obtain
it.263

That DEP felt pressure from DeVincenzo's office with respect to Talent Bank
candidates is also clear from DEP's handling of "candidate disposition sheets." When the
interviewing process was completed, the bureau at DEP that was hiring for the particular
vacancy filled out these forms, recording on them all the candidates interviewed, the results of
the interviews and the reasons why rejected candidates were rejected and the other candidates
selected. 264 DEP 's personnel staff then forwarded the candidate disposition sheets to
DeVincenzo's office along with the Planned Action Report for the particular hire. 265 If the
candidate disposition sheet did not indicate that all Talent Bank candidates had been
interviewed (or failed to state a sufficient explanation for not interviewing a particular

2 59 Jan. Tr. at 226-27 ; Hochstadt at 105-07; Roth at 103, 111-12.
260 Roth at 103. Although documents that DEP received from DeVincenzo's office may not have generally indicated the
persons who had first referred the 'City Hall specials,' DEP personnel staff knew or assumed that at least some of them had been
referred by political figures . (Hochstadt at 121-23; Roth at 99; Sullivan at 11-13.) As Gilvarry's testimony makes clear, see Section
l.C.5, above, this assumption was correct.
261
262

263

Jan. Tr. at 236-38; Roth at 107; Hochstadt at 144, 146-47.
Kennedy at 39-41.

J5!.

264 Jan. Tr. at 236, 274; Martin at 37-38; Roth at 113.
265 Hochstadt at 137, 143-44; Martin at 37-38.
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candidate) or did not adequately explain why a Talent Bank can'didate was not selected,
problems ensued. The hire would not be approved or the reasons why a Talent Bank candidate
had not been selected would be questioned. 266
Accordingly, DEP's personnel staff took care to review the candidate disposition
sheets when they were submitted by hiring bureaus. 267 If a candidate disposition sheet
indicated that a Talent Bank candidate was qualified but another candidate had been selected,
Carfora "would bang the table and say 'If a person is a City Hall candidate [and] is qualified for
the position, that person should be hired."' 268 The paperwork would then be returned to the
bureau. The message thus conveyed was that a qualified Talent Bank candidate should be
hired even if that meant passing over a more qualified candidate. 269

'•
I

Similarly, if a candidate disposition sheet failed to give a sufficient explanation
for not interviewing or selecting a Talent Bank candidate, DEP's personnel ~taff would either
contact the bureau and try to obtain an adequate explanation or return the paperwork to the
bureau. 270 On occasion, such "inadequate" paperwork was forwarded to DeVincenzo's office
despite these screening efforts. And as Roger Martin, the then-DEP Personnel Director,
explained, "Fred [Carfora] would be notified by City Hall and he would come flying down to my
office and rant and rave about how inefficient and careless we were in letting that happen." 271

D.

Leveraging Preferences: PAR Authority

DeVincenzo's office exercised extensive oversight authority, primarily through
review of PARs, over DEP personnel actions. The various preferences that "City Hall specials"
and Talent Bank candidates enjoyed in the hiring process at DEP were directly related to this
oversight authority. DEP employees believed that in order to secure DeVincenzo's approval for

266 Jan . Tr. at 235-38, 286; Hoch stadt at 144-46; Martin at 67-68.
267 Jan. Tr. at 247-48; Hochstadt at 152-54; Martin at 41-42, 45; Roth at 151-52, 154-56. Because they knew that they would
not be questioned about the adequacy of the reasons given for not selecting candidates who had not been referred by the Mayor's
Office, DEP's personnel staff reviewed only the explanations given for not selecting the Mayor's Office's candidates. Jan. Tr. at
247-48 ; Hochstadt at 155-56; Roth at 142, 155-56.
268 Jan. Tr. at 283.
269 Jan. Tr. at 282-85; Martin at 41-43.
2 7o Hochstadt at 153-55 ; Roth at 151-52, 154-55.
271

Jan. Tr. at 284.
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personnel actions, it was necessary to appease DeVincenzo by hiring City Hall candidates.
DeVincenzo's oversight authority thus served as a lever by means of which these preferences
were obtained.
Every month DEP submitted a post-audit and a pre-audit package of PARs to
DeVincenzo's office. The post-audit package consisted of between 80 and 125 personnel
actions that DEP could and did effectuate without DeVincenzo's prior approval. The pre-audit
package consisted of between 15 and 25 proposed personnel actions; actions such as certain
hires and promotions that DEP could not institute without the all-important "Jo_e D. letter." 272
Pre-audit PARs were supposed to be turned around (i.e., approved, disapproved
or returned for additional information) within a few weeks of their submission to DeVincenzo's
office. 273 Those submitted by DEP, however, were plagued by chronic delays. Most pre-audit
P ARs were not approved within a month of their submission; generally it took a longer period,
sometimes months longer, to secure an approval from DeVincenzo's office. 274 Virtually every
pre-audit package included actions that were subject to delays of up to six months. 275
Pre-audit P ARs relating to the hiring of "City Hall specials" or Talent Bank
candidates, however, were not subject to such protracted delays. They were approved much
faster. 276 Thus, pre-audit P ARs relating to the hiring or promoting of a non-referred candidate
--- and particularly those in which an existing DEP employee or an outside candidate was
promoted or hired over a referred candidate --- were the ones that were most likely to be
subject to extended delays. 277 DEP's employees did not fail to draw the lesson: delays were
attributable at least in part to the Department's failure to hire a sufficient number of referred
candidates. 278
In response to Hochstadt's inquiries, members of DeVincenzo's staff assured her

272 Jan. Tr. at 239·40; Roth at 135-36.
273 Jan. Tr. at 240 ; Hochstadt at 150.
2 74 Jan. Tr. at 240-43; Hochstadt at 150; Roth at 136.
275

Hochstadt at 165.

276 Jan. Tr. at 244; Hochstadt at 157-59; Roth at 143-44, 147. Prompt approval of a pre-audit PAR involving a 'City Hall
special' or Talent Bank candidate was another of the advantages these referrals enjoy ed.
277 Jan. Tr. at 241-45; Hochstadt at 157-59; Roth at 163-64.
278 Jan. Tr. at 244-45, 262, 264-65, 275-77 ; Hochstadt at 168-70.
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that delays were not attributable to deficiencies in the preparation of DEP's P ARs. 279
Sometimes, no explanations were given and those that were provided were viewed as
inadequate by DEP's personnel staff. 280 At times, members of DeVincenzo's staff told
Hochstadt that they had not yet reviewed or discussed with DeVincenzo long-delayed pre-audit
submissions. 281 Such inaction was alone sufficient, as Hochstadt testified, to "impl[y] to me that
[DeVincenzo] didn't feel like looking at DEP's submissions" because he was dissatisfied with the
agency.282
The implicit was sometimes made explicit. The "stock" explanation that Gilvarry
gave to Roth when she inquired about delayed P ARs was that "Joe was displeased either with
the agency in general or with a particular 'action or with some other action which was holding
up the rest of them." 283 The cause of displeasure with the agency, as Roth understood, was
DEP's failure to hire enough referred candidates and the cause of displeasure with a particular
action was DEP's having chosen to hire or promote someone other than the Mayor's Office
candidate. 284
The dispositions that displeased DeVincenzo were not necessarily limited to preaudit hires of non-referred candidates. Most personnel actions were subject only to after-thefact or post-audit review and thus were beyond DeVincenzo's direct control. Accordingly,
Hochstadt suspected that pre-audit actions may have been delayed because post-audit review by
DeVincenzo's staff revealed other personnel actions in which referred candidates had not been
hired. 285
Regularly, as often as every month, Carfora met with DeVincenzo in an effort to
obtain approval of long-delayed PARs. 286 Prior to these meetings, DEP's personnel staff would
brief Carfora about the details of the delayed actions and the reasons why approvals were
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important to the agency. 287 Because they understood that DEP had to "play ball" with City
Hall by doing it favors and hiring Mayor's Office referrals, they also briefed Carfora about the
recent hires of referred candidates. 288 Carfora, in turn, used this information in his meetings
with DeVincenzo to demonstrate the agency's cooperativeness and hopefully obtain approvals in
return. 289
These demonstrations of cooperativeness were generally not successful in
obtaining the requisite "Joe D. letter" approving delayed personnel actions.290 But sometimes
approvals were obtained. 291 Thus, the carrot of approval and the stick of delay led DEP to
continue to play ball.

287 Hochstadt at 174-75.
288 Jan. Tr. at 319-20, 326-27; Hochstadt at 177-79.
289

Js!. at 320-22.
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Hochstadt at 175-77; Roth at 161-62.

at 323-24.
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III
THE MAYOR'S OFFICE AND THE PERSONNEL
PRACTICES OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION

The Mayor's Office also exercised extensive influence over the personnel actions
of the Department of Transportation ("DOT') in the 1983-86 period. Vacancies in certain
types of laborer positions were dominated by City Hall referrals and job candidates referred by
City Hall enjoyed an array of advantages.

A.

Cooperating With The Mayor's Office

Robert Jean, Joseph DeMarco and Marsha Singer, three DOT personnel officials
in the 1983-86 period, 292 agreed in their testimony that the relationship between DOT and the
Mayor's Office was a cooperative one with respect to personnel matters. 293 For DOT, cooperation meant hiring and extending other favors for job candidates referred by the Mayor's Office.
As Jean testified:
Q

And by "cooperating," that means taking some of [City
Hall's] candidates?

A

Yes, playing the game the way it was supposed to be
played.

Q

And the game was, that you take their candidates--

A

The game was to help them out. Not to take everybody
they sent, and not to turn it into a total patronage
number, but take a reasonable number, our share as a
department, or however you want to put it. 294

The oversight authority that DeVincenzo's office exercised over DOT's personnel

292 During this time, Jean was the DOT Personnel Director; DeMarco was his deputy; and Singer was his staff assistant.
293 April Tr. at 42-43, 89-90; Jean at 56, 91-92; DeMarco at 146; Singer at 124.
294 Jean at 56.
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actions was a decisive factor in DOT's cooperativeness. AB DeMarco testified, "[w]e had a
large number of actions each month, and it wasn't conducive to business if you didn't cooperate
with [the Mayor's Office]."295 Jean testified that he knew "that other agencies had problems
with City Hall getting [personnel actions] approved, the time [delays], and all that," but DOT
cooperated and did not have such problems. 296
In the belief that cooperation was important to fair and expeditious review of
DOT's personnel .actions, DOT's officials cooperated by hiring and extending preferential
treatment to City Hall candidates. 297

B.

DOT Laborer Hiring

Hiring in at least four laborer titles --- ferry agent, deckhand, assistant highway
repairer and debris remover --- was dominated by candidates referred by the Mayor's Office. 298
No civil service list was in effect for these titles and, accordingly, provisionals were hired to fill
vacancies. 299 In general, DOT hired from lists of candidates sent by members of DeVincenzo's
staff, usually Gilvarry or Hein. 300 Some exceptions were allowed. If DOT had a candidate of its
own and sought approval from DeVincenzo's office to have that candidate considered, approval
was usually granted because of the cooperative relationship between DOT and DeVincenzo's
office. 301
Jean, moreover, testified that Anthony Ameruso, then the Commissioner of
DOT, instructed him to let him (Ameruso) know "if we w~re hiring any positions with a fairly
large number of candidates where there was no education or experience requirements that City
Hall might be interested in filling" so that Ameruso could make arrangements with DeVincen-

295 April Tr. at 89.
296 Jean at 91; see also April Tr. at 42.
297 April Tr. at 42-43, 89-90; Jean at 91-92; DeMarco at 38, 146; Singer at 124.
298 April Tr. at 12, 15-17, 69-74.

299
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300
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301

J.2. at 23.

14, 15, 74.

at 22-23, 78.
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zo's office. 302 By making such arrangements, 303 Jean explained, DOT obtained "credit" with the
Mayor's Office: "[i]t was credit for yourself, in a business sense, as an agency, and a credit for
him, as a Commissioner, in a sense, with the political establishment." 304
DOT did not post vacancy notices for these job titles, and was not required to
post by DeVincenzo's office, notwithstanding the 1978 mayoral directive requiring posting. 305
Rather, DOT regularly endorsed or stamped "posting waived" on P ARs relating to hires for
these titles or indicated that the hire was a Mayor's Office candidate for whom posting was not
necessary by writing out that fact or writing the letter "Z" on P ARs. 306 Nor did DOT's
personnel staff believe that there was anything improper about not complying with the 1978
directive. As Jean testified, "[p]osting for vacancies was a procedure established by the Mayor's
Office. If City Hall told you you didn't have to post, then you didn't have to post."307
Since DOT neither posted nor advertised vacancies in these laborer titles,
candidates sent by the Mayor's Office did not compete with the general public. The hiring
process at DOT for these positions was simple: absent exceptional circumstances, Mayor's
Office candidates were hired. 308 If DOT "rejected some [City Hall] candidates in favor of other
candidates from City Hall," it would not encounter difficulties from DeVincenzo's office. 309
Thus, DOT could and did reject a City Hall candidate who may have "reek[ed] of alcohol" or
"look[ed] like a bum." 310

302 J..Q. at 20-21. Jean testified that Ameruso also expressed uncertainty about whether he would be reappointed
Commissioner after the 1985 mayoral elections. Jean at 91.
303 Such arrangements were made from time to time. (Jean at 34-37.) For example, Jean and Singer both testified that
an arrangement was made to have assistant highway repairer vacancies filled by candidates from the Mayor's Office and from the
rank and file in a lower-paying position, the motor vehicle operators title. Jean and Singer believed that this arrangement was
agreed upon by Ameruso, DeVincenzo and the union leadership representing the motor vehicle operators. April Tr. at 19; Jean
at 35-30; Singer at 63-66.
304 Jean at 91.

305 April Tr. at 15-16, 69, 74.
306 !.Q. at 81-82, 87.

307 Jean at 27.

308 April Tr. at 25, 75-76.
309 Jean at 49.
310 !.Q.
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At times, the lists of candidates forwarded by DeVincenzo's staff ranked the
candidates in priority order. 311 DOT's personnel staff understood that interviewing and hiring
was to be done in accordance with the priorities stated on these lists. 312
DOT's personnel staff was not aware of any affirmative action component to the
candidates DOT received from the Mayor's Office for these positions. 313 The only impression
that they had concerning the ethnicity of candidates referred by the Mayor's Office was that for
Ferry Bureau jobs and the higher-paying, more desirable assistant highway repairer position, the
candidates from the Mayor's Office were comprised mostly of white males, and that most of the
minority candidates referred by the Mayor's Office were referred for the lower-paying and less
desirable debris remover position. 314 Statistics culled from DOT and Talent Bank records
confirm that impression. For the calendar years 1984 and 1985, over 85% of assistant highway
repairer, deckhand and ferry agent hires were white males. During the same period, over 70%
of the hires for the debris remover position were members of minority groups or women.315

C.

"Special" Hires

In addition to laborer candidates, DOT regularly received candidates from
DeVincenzo's office for a variety of jobs and accorded them various preferences in the hiring
process. 316 A member of DeVincenzo's staff would call DOT and say that it was important
that DOT find a job for the candidate or, in substance, state that a job should be found for the
candidate. 317
DOT, accordingly, would review the qualifications of the candidate and seek to
determine if there were any vacancies in the job titles for which the candidate might be

311

April Tr. at 78; see

~. Attachment J .

312 Jean at 49-50.
313 April Tr. at 83-84.
314 ]2. at 27-28, 85-86.
315 For a complete stati stical break down of th ese positions by gender and ethnicity, see Attachment H.
316 Jean testified that he was unsure about the frequency with which DOT received such candidates but estimated that DOT
received a 'couple' each month and perhaps more frequently in 1985. (Jean at 69.) Singer 'guesstimated' that DOT received
as many as ten each month. Singer at 95-96.
31 7 Jean at 68; Sing er at 92-93.
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qualified. 318
DOT sometimes "created" jobs for these candidates. That is, an agency as large
as DOT often had budget authority for particular positions and, even though the bureaus at
DOT which had such "vacancies" had no immediate plans to fill them, Mayor's Office candidates
would be hired for these "vacancies." 319 In other words, the Mayor's Office candidates
preceded the bureaus' plans to fill such openings. More often, however, DOT was able to
"slot" a Mayor's Office candidate into a vacancy which one of DOT's bureaus was seeking to
fill. 320 If the Mayor's Office candidate, however, was not qualified for the particular job title or
was seeking a salary higher than the maximum amount payable for the job title, DOT
sometimes changed the job title for the vacant position to accommodate the Mayor's Office
candidate. 321 Thus, the vacancy was adjusted to suit the candidate.
Some of these candidates, moreover, were "musts." 322 In other words, DOT had
no discretion and had to hire the Mayor's Office candidate. As Jean testified, Ameruso could
sometimes resist hiring particular Mayor's Office candidates but sometimes he could not. 323
With respect to these musts, Ameruso "would say, we have to do this one."324
For example, DeVincenzo's office presented a candidate to DOT along with a
particular set of duties he was to perform and DOT was required to find a title to fit the
candidate's qualifications and duties. When DOT could not find a suitable title, an obsolete
title --- Secretary to the Commissioner --- was resurrected. Although DOT had not considered
filling the "vacancy" for this title, which had remained vacant since at least 1970, the Mayor's
Office candidate was hired. When Jean told Commissioner Ameruso he found the appointment
"ridiculous," he was told it was "one that we had to do." 325

318

Jean at 68; Singer at 95.

319 Singer at 105-08.
320 !Q. at 92-94.
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!Q. at 96-98, 102-05.

322 April Tr. at 40; Jean at 70; Singer at 105.
323 Jean at 70.
324 !Q.
325 !Q. at 71; see also April Tr. at 33-34.
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D.

Other Preferences Accorded To
Mayor's Office Referrals

A Mayor's Office candidate referred to DOT enjoyed advantages not otherwise
extended to other job candidates. These advantages began at the time the agency initially
contacted the candidate, continued through the interview and hiring process and sometimes
extended through the employee's tenure.
A Mayor's Office candidate could expect to be contacted more quickly by DOT.
DOT officials normally contacted candidates by mailing a form letter. However, Mayor's Office
referrals were often telephoned the same day their names were received. They could then
expect interviews within a day or two of the initial contact. 326
After they were hired, Mayor's Office referrals were not dismissed without the
approval of the Mayor's Office. As DeMarco testified, "in theory" DOT could simply dismiss a
City Hall referral like a non-City Hall referral, "but, in reality, [DOT] probably didn't because
there was a general aura about the Mayor's Office, and, I think, in general people had a
concern not to take negative actions unless [there] were extraordinary circumstances." 327 And,
as DeMarco further testified, DOT's reluctance to dismiss Mayor's Office candidates was a
function of "general concern" about possible "repercussions" from DeVincenzo's office affecting
the review and approval of DOT's personnel actions. 328
Thus, DOT notified DeVincenzo's office before it terminated a Mayor's Office
referral.
At times, DeVincenzo'~ staff would not oppose the employees' termination, but in
some cases, they would request that the employee be given another chance or moved to
another bureau. 330 Because of the deference accorded to some of these Mayor's Office
referrals, Singer described them as "like bad pennies" that the agency could not get rid of. 331
Jean recalled one particular, albeit extreme, example:
329

326 Singer at 125-26.
327 April Tr. at 88-89.
328

J.s!.

at 89.

329 April Tr. at 39, Jean at 89-90; Singer at 42, 43, 121-122.

330

J.s!.

331

Singer at 122.
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There were a few musts. I remember one, and I don't rem ember
the man's name, where the guy came in and he was behaving very
strangely, and my staff in Appointments & Promotions came out
and said that this guy is not too straight, he was rambling and
babbling, and I went to the Commissioner and I said, "You know,
this guy is a problem, but I understood it to be important to City
Hall that he be put on," and he told me to hold off for a while
and he would check it out, and at a certain point, he said, "Look,
we have to find something for him," and we put him in the
Parking Violations Bureau.
After about two weeks, I got a call from them that he was very
disruptive, and I went to the Commissioner again and I said, "This
guy is very bad, he's, obviously, not all there," and, again I was
told, at a certain point, that we should give him another chance
somewhere else, and we put him in Ferries for a while, and I
think he fell down a ferry hatch, and I don't know what happened
to him. He was injured. He was on Workmen's Compensation.
I don't know what happened to him after that. 332

332 April Tr. at 40-41 .

..
-57-

IV

CONCLUSIONS

A.

Causes Of Patronage Abuses

The Talent Bank, established for laudable purposes, went awry for a combination
of reasons. First, it was part of the consolidation of Citywide personnel authority in the
Mayor's Office, most particularly in one mayoral assistant, Joseph DeVincenzo. By 1983, when
the Talent Bank was created, DeVin'cenzo had authority over "just about everything that can
happen to a City employee." DeVincenzo's powers over hires, promotions, transfers and salary
increases provided him with the means by which he could and did make sure that agencies
hired candidates referred by political figures, even though the formal hiring authority remained
with the agencies.
Second, the consolidation of personnel authority in the Mayor's Office coincided
with large and steady increases in the number of provisional and discretionary hires. The ability
of the Mayor's Office to give preferential treatment to candidates referred by political figures
was obviously severely circumscribed with respect to candidates hired from lists resulting from
competitive civil service examinations. The increase in the number and percentage of positions
filled without regard to such lists increased the opportunities for hiring based on political
considerations.
Ultimate responsibility for the Talent Bank, however, belongs to the Mayor, who
created it, publicly announced its creation, and appointed DeVincenzo to run it. By creating
the Talent Bank and investing it with both an affirmative action and a political mission, the
Mayor directed that it serve two unequal masters. In retrospect, it can be seen that, given the
danger that the political objectives of the Talent Bank would overwhelm its affirmative action
goals, and given the announced importance of the Talent Bank, strong measures were required
to monitor the situation and act decisively to prevent the abuses which developed.
The Mayor did not make clear the importance of the Talent Bank's affirmative
action goals to his aides who ran it or had dealings with it. Jerry Skurnick, for example,
testified that affirmative action was not one of the Talent Bank's major objectives, and
DeVincenzo certainly did not take this goal seriously. That DeVincenzo may have been acting
on his own in giving preferential treatment to candidates on the basis of their political
sponsorship is beside the point. He was exercising mayoral authority, and his actions
demonstrated a failure by the Mayor to communicate effectively his views of patronage to the
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person to whom it was most crucial that he do so.
Nor did the Mayor take adequate steps to monitor the Talent Bank's
performance. He did not learn until 1986 that high-paying laborer jobs had been filled
overwhelmingly by white males referred by political figures and that LoCicero and DeVincenzo
were soliciting candidates for those jobs from certain county leaders. Brezenoff, however, knew
these facts by February 1985 at the latest. That Brezenoff did not bring them to the Mayor's
attention until 1986 indicates that the Mayor had not impressed upon his chief assistant the
importance of the Talent Bank's affirmative action goal and his disapproval of patronage.333

B.

Consequences Of Patronage Abuses

Patronage inevitably results in serious consequences for integrity in government;
prominent among them are impaired employee professionalism and morale, decreased
administrative effectiveness and the distortion of public values by ulterior private influences.
The patronage practices revealed by the Commission's investigation did yield these results.

1.

Impaired Professionalism And Morale

The intrusion of political considerations into the personnel practices of DEP and
DOT had indisputable, if not readily quantifiable, adverse consequences on those agencies'
employees. These consequences are decidedly relevant to integrity in government because a
work force that enjoys a high sense of professionalism and morale is less vulnerable to
corruption than a work force in which cynicism and insecurity prevail.
Several members of DEP's personnel staff stated that political connections and
considerations affected hiring and promotion at that agency. Evidence supporting that
perception includes the extent to which the Mayor's Office dominated laborer hiring; its efforts
333

There are other exam ples of the effect of inadequate communication of policy concerning the Talent Bank and
patronage. The Talent Bank-related activities of John LoCi cero, Skurnick's immediate superior and a political advisor to the Mayor,
are inconsistent with a clear understanding of the Talent Bank's stated goals. In the solicitation of laborer candidate referrals from
county leaders, LoCicero failed to take effective steps to ensure that these key sources of cand idates referred minority and wom en
applicants. (April Tr. at 180-81, 207-08.) Also, the fact that documents reflecting the referral sources of candidates were
systematically destroyed, and referral source information deleted from the Talent Bank computer, is persuasive evidence that those
involved in the document destructi on at least belatedly understood that there was something wrong with what they had been doing.
tf the unacceptability of these practices had been communicated unequivocally to them previously, the practices and documents
would not have existed, and there would have been no occasion for destruction of the records .
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to push referred candidates; the preferences those candidates were accorded; the rules bent for
those candidates' benefit; and the chronic delays imposed on personnel actions of DEP by the
Mayor's Office.
The chronic delays in hiring staff at DEP, which occurred with a "fair amount of
regularity,"
had a particularly significant impact on morale precisely because of the
widespread perception that these delays were caused by political considerations. As former
DEP Personnel Director Roger Martin testified:
334

The morale impact, I think, was extensive, particularly among the
upper management personnel. When you, as a city manager, are
charged with the responsibility of carrying out a mandate of the
agency and providing service to the public, and you are unable to
fill your vacancies and staff up to the level at which you can
complete those responsibilities, your morale has to suffer, because
you're being called upon to do a job for the citizens of the City,
and not being given the resources, that is, the personnel in order
to do that job, and yet you're being held accountable to do the
job....
That's a very heavy morale burden on a manager, not to have the
resources and staff to be able to accomplish the work that he's
supposed to accomplish, and if the reason for that is a political
reason, that's twice as bad. 335
DEP Personnel staffers Cassandra Kennedy and Sherri Roth, and undoubtedly
many others, were troubled by the preferential treatment that the Mayor's Office referrals
enjoyed. Kennedy found it frustrating to be unable to help laborer applicants who came "off
the street" without connections, many of whom were members of minority groups, 336 especially
because those who were being hired were predominantly white males.
A sense of cynical resignation among at least some DEP employees was another
result of the intrusion of political considerations into DEP's personnel affairs. Roth testified
that while most of DEP's administrative staff were aware of and annoyed by this intrusion,
many simply accepted it as part of "life in the big city."337

334 Jan. Tr. at 241 .

335 ]2. at 286-87.
336 Kennedy at 28.

337 Jan. Tr. at 263.
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At least some DEP employees, however, could not so easily reconcile themselves
to the extent to which political considerations affected DEP personnel practices. Christopher
Sullivan, a DEP personnel staff member from January, 1984 to May, 1985, left DEP because he
became so disaffected by what he described as "unprofessionalism", "bending over backwards to
City Hall," and "political cronyism" relating to the intrusion of the Mayor's Office into his
work. 338 He testified, moreover, that he and his colleagues felt that they were unfairly excluded
from consideration for jobs which went to applicants referred by the Mayor's Office.339
The morale of DOT employees also suffered. Robert Jean, a former DOT
Personnel Director, and Marsha Singer both testified that they were concerned with the effects
on morale when, for example, employees with political connections received large salary
increases or were hired at disproportionately high salaries. As Jean put it:
It was difficult on the part of some of my subordinates when they
saw somebody -- someone who they had signed up and who they
knew did not sound like someone who was capable or someone
they dealt with that they knew was incapable, and they would be
getting a large increase and they would know that through that
person's connections either politically or personally, that they got
there. It had a bad effect. 340

In addition, the perception that some employees enjoyed protection against dismissal because
they had been referred by the Mayor's Office further damaged morale.
There was also a sense of resignation at DOT. Jean testified that while he tried
to hide from lower level staff the fact that politically referred candidates were being hired,
often at higher salaries than theirs,341 when they did become aware of it he passed on to them
advice he had received in 1970:
[W]hen I first came to work for the department, it bothered me,
and I went --- my boss had to sit me down --- my boss at that
time was the Personnel Director, Edward Rossomondo, and he
said to me, you have to learn to deal with this, because the

338 Sullivan at 5.

339 ,!2. at 83.
340 April Tr. at 63.

341 ,!2. at 49.
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Mayor does have the right to bring in his own people; and he
also said that, on a number of occasions --- and I have said that
to my own people, too, at times --- that you have to make a
choice. If you feel that these people --- or that you would be
better off by becoming politically active and referred this way,
then follow that path, but if you're not, then you have to put up
with this and do your job and not let it affect you. 342
These are convincing expressions of the impact of political patronage on
employee morale. As the perception of patronage spreads, it reduces the attractiveness of city
government service as a· career and can have a negative long-term impact on the quality of
public service that cannot be measured. The existence of patronage saps incentive for
meritorious service and diminishes penalties for substandard performance. Career employees
can become demoralized and cynical about their work. When they are committed to the
mission of the agency, they see that mission frustrated by political considerations. The cynicism
may be accompanied by resentment or resignation; in either case, employees' sense of
professionalism is demeaned because it receives limited reward or recognition. Worse,
employees see themselves compromised because they are required to participate in the
patronage practices they find offensive. And, inevitably, their motivation to oppose corruption
is lessened.

2.

Impaired Economy And Effectiveness
In Pursuing Public Objectives

The ability of the Talent Bank, DEP and DOT to serve their functions was also
directly affected by patronage practices. First, and most obviously, a major objective of the
Talent Bank, to increase hiring of women and members of minority groups, was seriously
undermined. As the evidence before the Commission demonstrates, the Talent Bank's chief
concern from 1983 to 1986 was to facilitate the hiring of candidates with political pedigrees.
Consequently, the Talent Bank referred for hire lower percentages of minorities and women
than the City as a whole hired in fiscal years 1983-84, 1984-85 and 1985-86. A particularly
stark example of the subversion of announced governmental values is presented by the hiring of
two classes of DOT laborers --- the mostly white assistant highway repairers, deckhands and
ferry agents and the mostly minority and female debris removers. 343

342 Jean at 103-04.
343 April Tr. at 27, 86.
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City resources were misused: DEP and DOT regularly hired candidates referred
by the Mayor's Office for positions that the agencies had no current plans to fill. In substance,
jobs were created for Mayor's Office referrals, regardless of the agencies' actual needs, through
efforts to find vacancies for which there was budget authority. And legitimate needs were
altered to suit Mayor's Office referrals.
At the same time, jobs that the agencies needed to fill were not staffed. DEP
was often unable to hire needed staff promptly. Laborer vacancies regularly remained unfilled
because of an insufficient number of Mayor's Office candidates despite the availability of
qualified, but "unconnected" candidates. Chronic delays in obtaining PAR approvals from the
Mayor's Office, which DEP staff believed resulted from not "playing ball" with DeVincenzo,
affected DEP in other ways. As Roth explained:
When you had a new hire, somebody who perhaps was either not
working or somebody looking for a new job, and perhaps it was
delayed because a Talent Bank person hadn't got a job, people
aren't going to wait four or five months or six months to be hired,
and we would lose a lot of people by the time we got an actual
approval that somebody could start. * * * So that's when it would
really hurt. You would wait for four months, five months, and
have a vacancy for this amount of time; we finally get the
approval, the person is gone, you have to start all over again.344
Roger Martin also testified to the inevitable consequences these delays had on
DEP's efficiency:
You would have programs that wouldn't be put into effect,
because the staff wasn't brought on in a timely fashion and,
basically, it gummed up the works, and the agency was less
efficient. 345
Pressures from the Mayor's Office, moreover, led DEP and DOT to hire
candidates on occasion who were at best marginally qualified. And the oversight authority
wielded by DeVincenzo's office led DOT to retain some Mayor's Office referrals who would
have otherwise been dismissed.

344 Roth at 138.
345 Martin at 64.
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These, of course, are classic examples of the effects of patronage practices on
administrative effectiveness. To the extent that they result in the compromising of
government's legitimate needs, they are also examples of corruption.

C.

Other Consequences Of The Mayor's Office's Practices

Apart from these consequences, the Commission's investigation uncovered other
troubling matters.
First, there was a clear sense that hiring rules and procedures could and should
be manipulated to satisfy the Mayor's Office. For example, posting requirements for certain
positions were routinely waived at DOT in order to find jobs for Mayor's Office referrals. At
DEP, those rating the qualifications of job candidates learned to "fudge" the scores in order to
resist pressure from the Mayor's Office to hire its referrals.
Another, potentially more damaging consequence concerns the fear of reprisal
for cooperation with government investigators. This Commission observed a striking difference
between the candor and forthrightness of witnesses who were no longer in the City's employ,
and some of those who were still on the payroll, especially provisional employees. The former,
on the whole, were much more willing than the latter to recall and describe details of the
personnel practices they witnessed. Some current employees were explicit in voicing fears of
retaliation if the fact or substance of their testimony were to come to light.
In addition, many of those employees directly involved in the execution of the
patronage practices also participated in the 1986 destruction of documents and were less than
candid in their sworn testimony concerning both their role in the patronage operation and the
document destruction. The destruction of documents and the lack of candor are among the
most serious byproducts of the patronage practices disclosed by the Commission's investigation.
While they may not be inherent to patronage, they should not come as a surprise. After all,
patronage employees, and particularly those who are provisional employees, lack job security. If
there is corrupt behavior, which they might otherwise report or resist, they may be less free to
do so because it may cost them their jobs. As Robert Jean testified when asked about the
effect provisional employees had on DOT administration:
From what I know from what happened in PVB when Jeffrey Lindenauer was talking about the hand held computers and they had
a committee of people reviewing this, most of those people were
provisional and were beholden --' not necessarily beholden to
them, but he had a lot of power over a lot of his subordinates
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that he wouldn't have if they were civil servants and at some
point, might have felt protected enough to say, no, I'm not going
to sign this or, I'm not going to do this, but if you're in a position
where you were vulnerable where you're provisional, or even past
a certain point as a manager, where someone can tum around and
when you say, no, I don't think this is right, or, I'm not going to
sign this, where you can lose your job or be demoted, it's very
unlikely that you'll say, "No," and in that sense, yes, I think it
hurts the City.346

346 April Tr. at 65.
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v
RECOMMENDATIONS

A

Patronage Has No Place In Public Personnel Systems.

The harm that results from patronage extends beyond the individuals whose jobs
are affected directly and the agencies where it most predominates. Its. presence in even a
limited way undermines government, for it subordinates the authority of government officials to
unaccountable political powers. By injecting ulterior and illegitimate influences in place of
formal standards and procedures, patronage impairs the integrity of government. Involving as it
does the deploying of public resources to serve private political objectives, patronage, though it
may not be either unlawful or invidious in intent, is itself a breach of the public trust. It simply
has no legitimate place in a public personnel system.
There is a limited place, acknowledged in civil service law, for political
considerations to play a part in hiring for top-level policy and professional or confidential
positions, that is, at the Commissioner and perhaps Deputy Commissioner levels. In
acknowledging the appropriateness of such "political appointments," it is important to define
clearly what they are and how they differ from patronage hiring.
In these few, very senior or confidential positions, it is important for an elected
chief executive to be able to select staff who will share his viewpoint about policy directions,
who will be accountable to him, serve at his pleasure and wholeheartedly share his agenda. As
with federal cabinet appointments, political considerations may be relevant, but merit-based
qualifications are also a sine qua !lQ!!.347
Experts consulted by the Commission were unanimous in describing the proper
role for politically influenced hiring in a public personnel system as a limited one. They
pointed out that the number of such positions in a municipality like New York City should be
on the order of a few hundred, not thousands. The entire federal government, with more than
two million civilian employees, includes only some 3,000 political appointees, and a recent indepth study ended with the recommendation that the number be reduced to not more than

347 Because merit is crucial, and because the reasons for discretionary hiring relate to policy, not just politics, this is not
patronage. Patronage Is something else. It places politics equal to or above merit, and dictates hiring, salary, promotion and firing
(or Immunity from firing) based on political factors.

..
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2,000.348

Despite the concrete adverse effects which accompany patronage, strong
pressures remain to adopt such practices in government. These pressures are brought to bear
by political and elected government officials who sometimes expect that the benefits of
government, including jobs, will be used to reward the supporters of those holding power or to
appease those who might otherwise be their opponents. Accordingly, they call on government
decisionmakers to provide such rewards for their support. 349 The perceived need of elected
leaders to build coalitions in order to stay in office or to gain acceptance for their programs
adds force to these pressures. Where those in elected office view government jobs as in some
sense "theirs" to award, they themselves become more vulnerable to these pressures from
without.350
The chief exe,cutive must meet these inevitable pressures with forceful and
unequivocal communications of the government's policy that patronage will not be tolerated.
This communication must go beyond public statements. The chief executive's staff must have
no doubt about this policy or the consequences that will follow if it is breached. Effective
internal controls and oversight mechanisms should be in place to detect and correct any
weakness in this respect.

B.

The Personnel System Must Be Restructured
To Discourage Patronage Abuses

The personnel system must be structured so as to protect against the possibility
of employment decisions based on political ties. Procedures must be put in place to assure
merit-based, open hiring throughout the system, and that political appointments are restricted to
those very few positions discussed above. Whenever possible, the day-to-day processes of
hiring, promoting, disciplining and dismissing public employees should be governed by
institutionalized procedures and routinely left to the trained professionals in the appropriate

348 Leadership for America: Rebuilding the Public Service. The Report of the National Commission on Public Service (Volker
Commission). Washington, O.C., 1989, p. 7.
. 349 LoClcero and Brezenoff both testified that county leaders complained that job candidates they referred were not obtaining
jobs in sufficient numbers. April Tr. at 395-96, 490.

350 This is one reason that the Commission rejects the argument that •an other things (in terms of merit qualifications) being
equal," it should be acceptable to prefer the politically referred applicant for a position at any level of government Where political
considerations for lower and middle level jobs are allowed any play, they open the door to abuse. The way is opened for political
factors to outweigh merit-based decisions in day-to-day actions of the employee who owes his job to politics. Inequities develop
in access to employment opportunities; so that the politically connected have an advantage. Other employees, equally meritorious,
come to feel that without a political sponsor their chances of advancement are inferior.
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agencies, namely, the Department of Personnel and the personnel departments within mayoral
agencies. While there must be effective oversight mechanisms in place, to assure that what is
expected is what is done, staff within the Mayor's Office should not be charged with case-bycase review of personnel actions. Nor should those oversight procedures be controlled, on a
day-to-day basis, by the same individual or group of individuals that controls the recruiting and
hiring process. The Mayor, of course, should retain the power, indeed responsibility, to dictate
overall policy objectives to Commissioners of all agencies, including the Department of
Personnel, and the authority to require that specific steps be taken to attain those objectives. 351
Specifically, the Commission recommends the following steps:
1. Staff within the Mayor's Office should have no role in
· individual day-to-day personnel decisions, such as Planned Action
Report ("PAR") and Managerial Position Description ("MPD")
review procedures.

2. A separate Appointments Office should be established for
senior, policy-level positions.
3. Firm requirements should be adopted for providing widespread
notice of employment opportunities. In addition to posting,
advertising in newspapers of general circulation should be
required. Posting and advertising should be required by law, not
by a waivable mayoral directive.
4. Where the threshold requirements of certain jobs make it
likely that large numbers of people can qualify and traditional
screening procedures might be inequitable, other procedures such
as lotteries should be used to ensure that the opportunities for
such jobs are fairly distributed.

5. The percentage of provisional employees in the City personnel
system should be drastically reduced. If overhaul of the civil
service procedures is required to accomplish this, a commission
should be empaneled to study and recommend effective changes.

351 These might include, for example, d!rectives to fill vacancies only in cases of urgent necessity; to authorize appointments
only after reviewing evidence of an affirmative action search; to encourage speedy appointment of environmental protection
inspectors needed for a new program, and the likQ.
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The Mayor's Office Should Not Have A Day-To-Day
Role In Personnel Decisions
As discussed above, the consolidation of the power to refer job candidates to

agencies and the power to review agency personnel actions in the Mayor's Office unit under
Joseph DeVincenzo was the crucial factor in the patronage practices disclosed by the
Commission's investigation. DeVincenzo's authority over the PAR and the MPD process
provided the muscle by which politically referred candidates were leveraged into DEP and
DOT. The testimony of DEP and DOT witnesses vividly demonstrates that they "played ball"
with DeVincenzo precisely because he exercised such extensive authority over their personnel
actions.
Staff within the Mayor's Office should not be directly involved in the oversight
of routine personnel decisions. They should be handled by the Department of Personnel, in
conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget, which are responsible for establishing
personnel procedures and reviewing personnel decisions.352 Within that framework of
oversight, appropriate control over hiring and firing should be delegated to the operating
agencies.
Removing day-to-day oversight responsibility from staff within the Mayor's Office
itself would not unduly impair the Mayor's ability to make sure that the personnel system is
well run, that its leaders follow his agenda or that they are accountable for its performance. To
the contrary, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners in the Department of Personnel, as
well as in the Office of Management and Budget, are directly accountable to the Mayor for the
effective performance of their duties, and the policies and practices they are to implement could
be dictated by the Mayor. The current practice, which involves staff within the Mayor's Office
in a second layer of detailed review, serves no essential purpose (and, in fact, is cumbersome
and counterproductive to effective management) but makes much more likely exactly what
happened in this case: the introduction of political considerations into personnel practices.

2.

A Separate Appointments Office
Should Be Established

The Mayor's Office should have direct authority over only the small number of
senim employees and other narrowly defined confidential employees for whom direct
accountability to the Mayor is important for reasons of policy. A separate office, removed from

352 It would be appropriate, for example, to establish an internal control system within the Department of Personnel and
individual agencies to monitor compliance with prescribed personnel procedures.
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the rest of the civil service and personnel system, should handle those few appointments. 353
Consideration should be given to the establishment of a screening panel, similar
to the Abrams panel, 354 to evaluate the merit qualifications of potential policy-level appointees.
In any event, to the extent that political considerations are involved in these appointments they
should be clear, public and open.

3.

Widespread Notice Of All Vacancies
Should Be Required By Law

The Mayoral Directive requiring posting of all job vacancies was waived or
ignored regularly, particularly when DOT and DEP were hiring large numbers of employees for
relatively unskilled jobs; in other words, precisely in the kind of hiring where posting was
especially important to the goal of attracting a wide pool of qualified candidates. Since posting
procedures were required by the Mayor's Office, DEP and DOT personnel staff viewed posting
as a requirement the Mayor's Office could waive. But waivers of this kind simply enhance the
possibility that patronage practices will exist and serve to narrow the availability of applicants
and reduce desirable competition for jobs.
Posting and advertising are fundamental to an open and equitable public hiring
system. Requirements for posting of vacancies, and even wider notification of the availability of
positions for which there are or may be large numbers of vacancies, should be rigorously
· enforced, and certainly not relegated to a position that "he who gives can take away." The
requirements should be clear and unequivocal, and should have the force of law. 355

353 Some have recommended that the Mayor's Office be allowed to participate in recruiting and referral of City employees,
so long as it does not also have responsibility for routine oversight review of personnel actions. Others oppose such a role for
the Mayor's Office, since this, itself, would create the risk of politicizing those decisions.
The Commission opposes a system which involves the Mayor's Office in receiving political referrals of the names of
candidates for government employment As a practical matter, once the notion of political referrals for City jobs has been given
an institutional blessing (as by creating an office through which such referrals are processed) the way is that much more clear
for it to be abused, for 'all other things' not to be so equal, and for those within and outside the system to believe that they are
not.

354 Under present practice, the Mayor's Committee on Appointments, chaired by Floyd Abrams, submits recommendations
to the Mayor from which the Mayor appoints members of nine commissions and boards, subject to confirmation by the City
Council.
355 If there are circumstances which might warrant departure from the requirement, the possible range of circumstances
should be statutorily prescribed and a procedure should be established to ensure that exceptions are made rarely, for documented
reasons, as authorized by appropriate reviewing personnel, and are open to public scrutiny.

-.
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4.

Open And Equitable Selection Procedures ·Should Be Adopted For All Positions

There are potentially a significant number of positions for which traditional
testing methods may not be suitable screening devices. Among these are possibly a number of
jobs, such as laborer jobs, for which there may be minimum qualification requirements, yet
which command relatively high salaries, and thus would be attractive to a large number of
applicants. 356 In these situations, alternative procedures must be developed, to ensure that
these positions are available on an open and equitable basis, and selections among those
qualified are made in a fair way. The lottery procedure adopted by the Talent Bank in recent
years seems one viable alternative. ·Certainly others can also be developed. The standard must
always be that the procedures be open and available on an equitable basis to all who qualify.357

5.

The Percentage Of Provisional
Employees Must Be Drastically Reduced

One of the critical tasks of the Department of Personnel must be to reduce the
percentage of provisional employees and other discretionary hiring in the City personnel system.
The number and percentage of provisional employees in New York City government today are
shockingly high and increasing annually.
There are currently more than 30,000 provisional employees (over 20%) in the
work force in the mayoral agencies alone.358 In addition, there are over 2,000 employees in
positions to which they were provisionally promoted, nearly 12,000 employees in noncompetitive positions, and over 750 employees in exempt classifications. Thus, more than 30%
of the City's work force are in discretionary positions in their current jobs. In 1978, only 3% of
the work force held provisional positions, and only 10% were in discretionary positions. 359

356 During the time period covered by this investigation, certain laborer positions for which there had been competitive
testing requirements were reclassified by the State Civil Service Commission, at the City's request, into non-competitive Laborer
Class titles. The Commission cannot and does not comment on the appropriateness of particular classifications. The crucial
requirement is that all positions, whether competitive class or laborer class, be openly and equitably available to those who qualify.

357 Other positions may also be difficult to test for in the traditional manner historically used in civil service systems. In
all these cases, the principle remains the same: selection procedures must be devised which will make these positions available
on an equitable basis to those who would be qualified to perform the work.

358 This excludes the Transit Authority, the Department of Education, the Health and Hospitals Corporation, and the nonpedagogical component of the City University system, as well as other agencies with fewer employees.
359 See Attachment 0 .
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The experts consulted by the Commission have unanimously described these
figures as "shocking," "astonishing," "alarm bells." One has said they represent the "demise of
the civil service system." It has been said that these figures cannot be appropriate within the
terms of the Civil Service Law and rules, particularly the provision of state law which provides
that employees hired provisionally cannot remain for more than nine months without going
through civil service procedures. 360
This high percentage of provisional employees has important implications for
integrity in government, some of which are reflected in the circumstances of this case. For
example, provisional employees are, by defi~ition, very vulnerable. 361 To quote one expert,
"there is no such thing as a 'provisional whistleblower.'" Also, an environment so full of
discretionary hiring lends itself readily to patronage abuse, particularly when no safeguards exist
to prevent that from happening.
The civil service system faces enormous pressures, and the recent growth in the
number of provisionals stems from several causes.362 Other jurisdictions, however, have experienced similar pressures, have devoted considerable resources to study and reform of their
merit-based public employment systems, and have developed techniques which show much
promise. This Commission has not undertaken such a study. But the portion of New York
City's hiring and personnel practices the Commission has examined in depth dramatically
highlights today's problems, and points the direction for what remains to be done.
The New York City civil service system is in a state of crisis. Anecdotal
evidence related by experts, and confirmed by a number of Commission staff interviews, suggest
that the Civil Service Law is now widely regarded as something it is desirable to bypass or
. avoid, where possible. Adherence to the law is viewed as hampering the effective recruitment,
deployment, and retention of qualified workers. The expression "civil service mentality" is a
pejorative description of a bureaucrat who mindlessly follows rules and cannot get anything
done.

360 New York Civil Service Law§ 65.2. The New York State Civil Service Commission, which oversees the City system, has
not audited the City since before 1978. Commission on Government Integrity staff were told it would require all the audit resources
of the entire State Commission for over a year, to perform such an audit.

361 Although the most recent City union contracts provide for some job security for employees who have been provisional
hires for more than two years in the same title (itseH a recognition of serious problems of compliance with the letter of the civil
service laws), these safeguards do not apply to managerial employees.
362 For example, intense pressures both from lawsuits over the unequal impact of the tests used in public hiring, and from
the vastly increased demands placed on City employees to deliver complex services, have hindered the City's ability to recruit
employees in the manner it did years ago.

..
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Clearly, more is needed than just effective enforl:ement of current law; more is
needed than even a dedicated audit by the State Civil Service Commission could provide. One
high-level employee described what is needed as a "Moreland Act Commission focusing solely
on the civil service/personnel issues."363 There are skills, talents and experience in the private
sector, and in other jurisdictions. All should be enlisted for a comprehensive attack on the
problem.

Dated:

New York, New York
August 1989

STATE OF NEW YORK

COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY
John D. Feerick
Chairman

Richard D. Emery
Patricia M Hynes
James L. Magavem
Bernard S. Meyer
Bishop Emerson J. Moore
Cyrus R Vance

363 Since mid-century, the New York City public personnel system has been the repeated subject of detailed expert study
and comprehensive reform~. Mayor's Committee on Management Survey (1952) ; Josephs Commission on Government of New
York -City (1958)) but it has been some fifteen years since anyone studied the City personnel system in any comprehensive way.
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APPENDIX

DEVINCENZO'S RETIREMENT
A

Introduction

Little more than a month after the Commission's January 1989 public hearings at
which DeVincenzo testified, he retired from City service at age 46. Prior to his retirement,
DeVincenzo took a number of steps --- consistent with current law --- which had the effect of
locking in his eligibility for a $52,000 annual pension before any pending investigation of his
conduct could be concluded.
The Commission has previously examined the subject of pension forfeiture for
public employees engaged in wrongdoing. 1 DeVincenzo's ability to retire before any action
could be taken which might have jeopardized his lucrative pension prompted the Commission to
explore the details of DeVincenzo's retirement as an illustration of the operation of the current
pension law in the absence of a forfeiture provision.

B.

Navigating The Shoals Of
The New York City Retirement System
1.

DeVincenzo's Dealings With The Retirement System

By dint of his authority, DeVincenzo was able to command the personal
attention of the senior staff of the New York City Employees' Retirement System ("NYCERS").
Virtually every step of the processing of DeVincenzo's retirement papers was preceded by
extensive consultation with retirement system officials designed to maximize the chances that his
retirement plans would not be made known to his employer, the Mayor, or to the New York
City Department of Investigation ("DOI") and to minimize the likelihood that disciplinary action
could be taken against him before he retired. 2
Early one morning in January 1989, DeVincenzo met Harold Herkommer, the
1 The Commission's recommendations for pension forfeiture legislation are set forth in its report, 'Crime Shouldn't Pay: A
Pension Forfeiture Statute for New York' (May 1988).
2 Under the applicable retirement law of New York State, a public employee who perfects his retirement application and
retires before any disciplinary action is taken, is entitled to receive a pension, whether or not he or she is subsequently convicted
of a crime.

-.
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executive director of NYCERS, at the corner of West Broadway and Chambers Street. This
meeting had been arranged at DeVincenzo's request, on the theory that it would be imprudent
for him to be seen at Herkommer's office at 220 Church Street. 3
From the corner, they walked to a nearby diner. There, DeVincenzo posed
certain questions: Who would be notified of his retirement? When would his retirement
become effective? How does NYCERS count the 30-day minimum waiting period between the
time an application to retire is first filed and an employee's earliest effective retirement date? 4
The last question, in particular, was one to which DeVincenzo returned over and
over again in the course of the next several weeks. Under the rules of the Uniformed
Sanitation Force retirement plan for which DeVincenzo was eligible, a retiring employee must
provide the City with a minimum of 30 days notice before his retirement can become effective.
According to the retirement system's rules, the employee who puts in for retirement in 30 days
must still be on the City payroll on the 29th day of the waiting period in order to collect his
pension. 5 If at any point prior to the 30th day, the employee is discharged, he loses his right
to a pension altogether. If he is demoted and his salary reduced, his pension is proportionally
diminished, since the lion's share is based on the employee's salary on his last day of service. 6
Herkommer estimated that he had at least half a dozen discussions with
DeVincenzo or his aides in January and February 1989 about how the 30-day minimum waiting
period was to be reckoned and what would be his earliest retirement date.7 Not once did
DeVincenzo personally appear at NYCERS' office. When he wanted to speak with
Herkommer, he arranged to meet him out of the office, or called him at home or from a pay

3 April Tr. at 279-81. As Herkommer stated in private testimony to the Commission, 'If a Commissioner walks into my office,
all the phones start ringing that day, and the next thing, the Mayor is told, you know, hey, so and so is leaving you.• Herkommer
at 24.
4 April Tr. at 281-82; Herkommer at 46-47.

5 See Rule 25 of the New York City Employees' Retirement System:
Except as otherwise provided within these rules, service retirement and ordinary disability
retirement shall take effect on a date not less than thirty days nor more than ninety days
after the date of filing of application for retirement with the Board of Trustees while in cityservice, provided that as to service retirement, applicant was also in city-service on the day
prior to the effective retirement date.
(emphasis added.)

6 April Tr. at 299-300.

7 !Q. at 300-01.
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phone. Aides delivered and retrieved the necessary retirement papers.
On Friday, January 20, 1989, Jean Ross, DeVincenzo's secretary and
administrative assistant, appeared at NYCERS' office with DeVincenzo's retirement application.
Both Herkommer and NYCERS' deputy executive director had left for the day. In their
absence, DeVincenzo's retirement application was rejected by the supervisor of NYCERS'
Information Room because the application was unsigned and the space where the retirement
date was to be filled in had been left blank. 8
Ross reached Herkommer at home by telephone from NYCERS and informed
him of the difficulties she was having with the processing of DeVincenzo's retirement papers.
After briefly discussing the possibility of taking the papers back to DeVincenzo for his signature
and then returning to NYCERS that day, they decided that an aide would bring the papers in
on Monday, January 23.9 Herkommer assured Ross that he would be in his office, as usual, at
7:30 a.m. to receive DeVincenzo's retirement papers personally.
On Monday, January 23, 1989, 10 Herkommer arrived at the office shortly before
8 a.m. to find that Robert Valenotti, an aide in DeVincenzo's office, had already called to
check if Herkommer was in. Minutes later, Valenotti appeared and delivered DeVincenzo's
retirement application. 11 The effective retirement date chosen by DeVincenzo was 90 days

8

12·

at 287-90.

9 April Tr. at 289. These arrangements were confirmed over the weekend of January 21 and 22 in the course of several
additional telephone calls to Herkommer's home from DeVincenzo and Ross. 12· at 290-91.
10 Herkommer testified that after he received DeVincenzo's retirement application on January 23, he handed it to his deputy,
Sara Tufano, and instructed her to deliver it to the Information Room, from which, in the normal course of events, it would have
been picked up by an internal messenger on one of several daily mail runs and taken to the mail room to be clocked in. Herkommer at 143-49.
Herkommer was at a loss to explain how DeVincenzo'e retirement application, which he testified he received early in the
morning of Monday, January 23, 1989, was not clocked into NYCERS until 11:15 a.m. on January 24. (Herkommer at 138-49.)
NYCERS prides itself on avoiding this kind of discrepancy, since, as Herkommer explained:
"[Tlhe most Important thing at the Retirement System is the clock-in date. Beneficiaries are
designated on death beds. Five minutes make a difference between a benefit of a quarter
of a million dollars. We live and breathe clock-in days."
Herkommer at 138-39.
Herkommer testified that. at his request, his staff checked a sampling of other documents filed at NYCERS on January
23, 1989 and found that they were all clocked in on January 23. The discrepancy in DeVincenzo's case could therefore not be
attributed to a failure in the clock-in mechanism. Herkommer at 147; April Tr. at 293-94.
11 April Tr. at 286, 291-92.
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hence --- April 23, 1989. 12

DeVincenzo did not, however, wait until April 23 to retire. At midday on
Tuesday, February 21, 1989, Ross and Valenotti again appeared at the NYCERS office. They
brought with them an Affidavit to Change Retirement Date, signed by DeVincenzo, which
accelerated his retirement date from April 23 to February 22, 1989. 13 However, DeVincenzo's
aides had no intention of filing his affidavit to change the retirement date as early as noon on
the 21st. Rather, they wanted Herkommer's deputies, John Murphy and Sara Tufano, to review
the affidavit to make sure that it was properly filled out. Having been assured that the form
was correctly filled out, Ross and Valenotti left the office without filing it. 14
Later that same day, at approximately 4:45 p.m., Ross returned alone. She
brought with her the affidavit that Murphy and Tufano had checked for her earlier that day
and handed it to Murphy, who walked it down to the mail room to time stamp it. 15
The events of February 21, 1989 had been carefully choreographed by
DeVincenzo and his aides well before that day. Herkommer recalls having a series of
conversations with Ross spanning a three-day period prior to February 15 to go over the
calculation of the 30-day waiting period and to confirm that February 22, 1989 would be the
earliest effective date on which DeVincenzo could retire. 16
Discussions between DeVincenzo and NYCERS during the week of February 13
were not limited to the question of the earliest date that DeVincenzo would be eligible for
retirement. There was also an extended discussion of when the last possible moment was that

12 There is some evidence that, despite the fact that DeVincenzo initially designated a retirement date 90 days away, he
intended from the outset to retire in 30 days. Herkommer recalls that prior to January 23, he had discussions with DeVincenzo
about how to count the 30-day waiting period and about changing the retirement date between the 90th and the 30th day. In this
regard, Herkommer recalls telling DeVincenzo that he did not need the approval of his employer to make that kind of change.
Herkommer at 8.
13 Murphy at 68-69; April Exhibit 50. Herkommer had previously provided the Affidavit to Change Retirement Date to
DeVincenzo on February 15, 1989. On that date, he and DeVincenzo had a second meeting at a diner in the vicinity of NYCERS;
the purpose of the meeting, as Herkommer recalled it, was for DeVincenzo to supply the papers necessary to document his date
of birth.
Herkommer recalled walking back from the diner toward his building and inviting DeVincenzo up to his office to tile his birth
certificate papers. DeVincenzo declined. Herkommer recalls taking the birth certificate papers up to his office and then going back
down to meet DeVincenzo in the lobby to hand him the Affidavit to Change Retirement Date. April Tr. at 304-07.
14 Murphy at 69-71.
15

!2· at 75-76.

16 April Tr. at 301-04, 307-08.
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DeVincenzo could file the papers necessary to change his retirement date to February 22. 17
Specifically, DeVincenzo wanted to know how close to the end of the day on February 21 he
could file the change. 18
Herkommer discussed this issue with his staff and they advised DeVincenzo's
staff to try to file the affidavit before 5 p.m. on February 21. 19 DeVincenzo followed that
advice punctiliously: his affidavit to change retirement date from April 23, 1989 to February 22,
1989 was clocked in at 4:59 p.m. on February 21, 1989.20
2

The Missing Notice To DOI

One of the concerns DeVincenzo voiced at an early meeting with Herkommer in
January 1989 was who would be notified of his retirement. Herkommer told him that DOI was
the only agency to be notified. DeVincenzo pressed him, asking how long it would take for
DOI to receive notice. Herkommer told him that notice to DOI typically goes out three to
eight days after the retirement application is filed. 21
It was NYCERS' normal practice in January 1989 to send to DOI, on a periodic

basis, printouts of the names of all employees who filed for retirement. These printouts were
generated by NYCERS and hand-delivered to DOI by the City's Central Messenger Service. 22
A log maintained by NYCERS suggests that the printout for retirement
applications clocked in on January 24, 1989, the date DeVincenzo's application was clocked in,
was sent to DOI on January 31, 1989, along with printouts for retirement applications received
on January 25, January 26 and January 27. However, DOI is missing not only the January 24
printout and the other three printouts which, according to NYCERS' log, were sent to DOI on
January 31, but is also missing a subsequent batch of printouts which NYCERS' log indicates

17 Murphy at 54-55.
18

!Q. at 72-75; April Tr. at 309-10.

19 Murphy at 72-75.
20 April Exhibit 50.

21 April Tr. at 282, 285-86.
22

!Q. at 294-95.

..
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were sent on February 6, 1989.23 As of February, no particular person at DOI was responsible
for making sure that a printout was received from NYCERS for each working day. 24
3.

Belated Notice To The Mayor's Office

In January 1989, NYCERS changed its practice of notice to and approval by the
employing agency of an employee's expression of intent to change retirement dates. Prior to
January 1989, it was NYCERS' normal practice to notify the employing agency and to seek the
employing agency's approval in the event that an employee wanted --- as DeVincenzo did --- to
change his retirement date.
This practice --- which was in effect for as long as anyone at NYCERS can
remember --- was changed in late December .1988 or early January 1989. Without consulting
his Board of Trustees, Herkommer abolished the requirement that the employing agency
approve an employee's proposed change of retirement date. 25 Had DeVincenw, for instance,
filed his retirement papers in November 1988 and sought to advance his retirement date in
December, a letter would have been sent to the Mayor advising him of the change of
retirement date and requesting the Mayor's approval. Because that practice was abolished just
weeks before DeVincenzo filed for retirement, the only notice sent to the Mayor's Office was
sent after his retirement was a fait accompli. 26
Thus, on February 17, 1989, when Deputy Mayor Brezenoff and Chief of Staff
Diane Coffey met with DeVincenzo to tell him that the Mayor had concluded that he should
resign, DeVincenw surprised them by telling them that he had already put in his retirement
papers, effective in 90 days. 27

23 DOI also determined that it is missing printouts for over 80 working days in the preceding year.

24 In the wake of DeVincenzo's retirement, DOI and NYCERS have modified their procedures for transmitting and receiving
the printouts. NYCERS now sends the printouts to DOI by fax machine instead of by messenger; if, for some reason, on a given
day no printout is sent, NYCERS faxes a message to DOI to advise them that no printout is being sent that day. (Herkommer at
203-04.) A DOI employee is responsible for calling NYCERS if nothing is received.
25 April Tr. at 312·18. Herkommer testified that he changed the policy on -agency approval for applications to change a
retirement date so as to effect consistency with a different rule change, approved by NYCERS' Board of Trustees on December
21, 1988, eliminating the requirement that the employing agency be notified and its approval sought when an employee seeks
to witMraw his retirement application. !.Q. at 317·18; Herkommer at 8-18, 55-69.
26 April Tr. at 282-83, 315, and April Exhibit 51.
27 Thia was not the first time that DeVincenzo had spoken to Brezenoff about the possibility of retiring. Either immediately
before or immediately after DeVincenzo testified at the Commission's public hearings on January 11, 1989, he asked Brezenoff
whether the Mayor wanted him to resign. Brezenoff responded that the Mayor had not indicated any such desire. During that
conversation, DeVincenzo gave Brezenoff to understand that while he had no immediate plans to retire, if he were to do so 'it
(continued ... )
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Stunned, Brezenoff pressed DeVincenzo to tell him when he had done so.
According to Brezenoff, DeVincenzo could not remember the date. At first, he told Brezenoff
he had put in his retirement papers "a week or so ago." When Brezenoff pressed him further,
DeVincenzo had to look through his papers to find the date. 28 Brezenoff told DeVincenzo
that the Mayor wanted him to leave by the end of March;29 DeVincenzo said that he would
have to think it over.30
The facts outlined above strongly suggest that by February 17, when Brezenoff
asked for DeVincenzo's resignation, DeVincenzo had already effectively mapped out his strategy
for retiring without the loss of his pension. By February 17, he had already secured from
NYCERS not only the papers necessary to advance his retirement date, but had worked out in
detail the precise date and time he would make that change. Although he sought Brezenoffs
assurances on February 17 that the Mayor had no immediate plans to fire him, 31 DeVincenzo
took no chances. To Brezenoffs surprise, DeVincenzo informed him on February 23 that he
had taken himself off the payroll the previous day. 32
C.

Conclusion And Recommendation

In April 1988, the Commission recommended that state law be changed to
permit the forfeiture of pension rights of public employees convicted of a felony related to their
employment. If such forfeiture was permitted, it would occur upon conviction. The timing of
the filing of the employee's retirement papers would not be relevant to the forfeiture
determination.

In the absence of such a change in the law, the current New York City system
'renders critical the timing of the retirement notice and the employee's choice of an effective
retirement date. In theory, the current system is designed to allow the City to determine, prior

27 (... continued)
would be three, four months into the future.' April Tr. at 504-05.

28 April Tr. at 511-12.

29

12·

30

12· at 582.

31

12·

at 513.

32

12·

at 516-17.

at 510-13, 582.
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to the employee's retirement date, whether wrongdoing has <!>CCurred sufficient to discharge or
demote an employee, and thereby affect his pension. In practice, as DeVincenzo's maneuvers
demonstrate, that system is seriously flawed. In the absence of the recommended changes in
the state law, the Commission concludes that it is imperative that the City system be changed to
condition a public employee's pension on the employee providing written notice of intent to
retire at least ninety days in advance of the proposed retirement date to the employee's agency
head and to DOI. In addition, the City should provide that the designated retirement date may
not be accelerated without the written approval of the employee's agency head.
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ATTACHMENT A
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

DEP

New York City Department Of Environmental Protection

DOI

New York City Department Of Investigation

DOP

New York City Department Of Personnel

DOT

New York City Department Of Transportation

FISA

New York City Financial Information Services Agency

MPD

Managerial Position Description

NYCERS

New York City Employees' Retirement System

OMB

New York City Office Of Management and Budget

OMLR

New York City Office Of Municipal Labor Relations

PAR

Planned Action Report
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ATIACHMENT B
LIST OF PUBLIC HEARING WITNESSES

JANUARY 9, 1989

Dr. David H. Rosenbloom
Dr. William Michael Johnston

Nydia Padilla-Barham
Annette Luyanda-Medina
Sherri Roth
Roger Martin
JANUARY 11, 1989

Fred Carfora
James G. Hein
Joseph DeVmcenzo
APRIL 4, 1989

Roben Jean
Joseph DeMarco
Joy Schwanz
Jerry Skurnick
Peter Gilvarry
Harold Herkommer
APRIL S, 1989

Gerald Levy
Helen Mosley
John LoCicero
Stanley Brezenoff
Mayor Edward L Koch
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ATIACHMENT C
LIST OF EXPERTS CONSULTED
Dr. David H. Rosenbloom - Maxwell School of Citizenship
and Public Affairs, Syracuse University
Dr. William Michael Johnston - Political Science Department,
Colgate University
Dr. Annemarie Walsh - Institute of Public Administration
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BREAKOOYN OF CITY YORKFORCE
MAYORAL AGENCIES

llM

PERMANENT
EMPLOYEES

•••••.•.•.••••••.•••••• 0 I SCRET I ON ARY .•••••••••••••••••••••
NON-PERMANENT
PROV.
PROV. PROM.
NON·COMPETITIVE
EXEMPT

TOTAL
DISCRETIONARY
EMPLOYEES

TOTAL

1978

90,486
C89.4X)

3,329
(3.3X)

4,605
C4.6X)

2,485
C2.5X)

288
( • 2r.)

10,707
C10.6X)

101, 193
C100X)

1979

94,505
(89.2X)

6,583
C6.2X)

1,594
C1. 5X)

2,961
C2.8X)

282
C.3X)

11,420
C10.8X)

105 925
(100X)

1980: .:

90,532
(86.4X)

9,304
(8.9X)

1,498
(1.4X)

3, 153
(3.0X)

290
(.3X)

14,245
C13.6X)

104,777
(100X)

NA

NA

NA

1981

NA*

NA

NA

1982

89,975
(77 .9X)

18,523
C16.0X)

2,869
C2.5X)

3,830
(3.3X)

295
C.3X)

25,517
C22.1X)

115,492
C100X)

93,425
(78.6X)

17,915
(15.1X)

2,627
C2.2X)

4,657
C3.9X)

311
(.2X)

25,510
C21.4X)

118,935
C100X)

96,091
C77 .8X)

19,527
C15.8X)

2,162
C1. 7X)

5,257
C4.3X)

529
C.4X)

27,475
C22.2X>

123,566
C100X)

1983

1984

-

·"i''
.)

I

\

I

1985

98,117
C75.6X)

23,559
( 18.1r.)

1, 780
C1.4X)

5,787
(4.5X)

519
( . 4")

31,645
C24.4X)

129,762
C100X)

1986

102,134
C74.4X>

23,505
C17.1X)

1, 4 72
C1. 1X)

9,641
(7 .OX)

505
( .4r.)

35,123
C25.6X)

137,257
C100X) ·

1987

105,289
C74.8X)

25,432
C18.1X)

1, 322
(.9X)

8,212

c5. 8X>

543
(.4X)

35,509
(25.2X)

140,798
C100X)

103,551
C69.8X)

30,240
C20.4X)

2,042
(1.3r.)

11,836
(8.0X)

751
(. 5~0

44,869
(30.2X)

148,420
C100X)

1988

*

Not Available

Source · Department of Personnel Annual Reports
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Phone

--------------------------------------------------------------------:--.---------.:\·
1.

Ti~les

~re~s

E~=c=~ise
0

.

.

Office Associate

of

0

(clerical-N T- 11 ; comm · a ffairs-15)

Shop Clerk
Police Adm. Aide
Stock Handler

j (; .

'ln .)

c.omm. Associate ~- "· ···
.z.ri.-::.!.=:::::-:i. Sa.la=y
fl , (
r
)

2.

(

. 3.

Ja.
4•

s.
yes
o=

6.

Ft:ll-ti.::ie

rJ@would
y~s

Pa=~- t.:..~e

7.

p2.::-~-ti-~e

l:::::e
yes ·

o=
no

CJ WoulC.

z:-:.i.=~ tlo:-~:? lfW
~

I

f"ull-tir::e te cc:-.s :..c=::-ec?
8.

Wee~:e~cs? ~

o:::::
no

~-\c:c:~' l

9 ..

7

-~ _

I
P!-!:::1e No.

------------------,-......,..------------------i ---~--------.-·-------------------------·
I'

·-

-.;

. - - --

-

o;..7~

'T'T~T'="

I

I

I

I

I

.. I

I
I

I.,
.. I

.
- .. ·. ~ ·_. .
I
')

-

j.

'•

..

I

.
-

.

'• .

.....

I
~

ATTACHMENT

..

E

' IJ'!° • ... -

OFFICE OF THE

·· -'\

l~~-':· ·.

RESUME COVER

M.~YQR

~HEET

IJ_f_;~=e i.-~·.! ·cc_~I ''-

)fddz:: Repfehrornae· ~~. :;r)c_e .5 ~{Ult.<.~£ .Date

-r:.·,.,. Eth:nc_ ~ ..

Sex

. _,

\.:=

-

1

Rec d

I;

,I

-~~~~--------~------------------------·
-------------------------------------..
:....:·

•·

·1.

Areas of Exoertise

7itles

(health-15; clerical-07; community affai
Community Assistant
Office Aide

2.

Minimum Salary

3.

Special Skills

6,-JI ,,CCO
(foreign language, typing, word processing, · etc.)

~('\"~ '3 5 t)f<1'·
3a. Driver~ License?

4.

Post

Gradua~e

t\JD
-----

Degrees

·~~--:c7e;·~·~;1:· ~;~, -~~~=t~~~·~---;:-~~-ecc~-~s

·

(specify}

yes
or
no

yes
or
no

Full-time ~Would part-time be considered? !~

6.

cJ

yes
yes
or .
or
. .
no ..
no
Part-time
Would full-time · be :corisidered?

CJ

Shift Hork?

7.

i.!Q

'"

..

CJ

8. Weekends?

'iES

9. Addt' l · Phone No.

_____ _:. ___ 1-~-------r----:----~------------:----------~---~--- ·-----------·.;.. __
DATE

~

(""l,

AGENCY ·

C-$0.

.

TITLE

DISPOS!TIOr-!

~ ~

,

'•

I
.

ATTAC.

1

E

-

Date of Review

OFFICE OF THE
RES~MS

Na::\e

.Gll L.C( Ir.?-\. LPrrJr;t_7l.L AW

Eth!1ici t:z'

Sex

/VJ

~L~YOR

COVER SHEET

Re fe!'."::2.l Source

L&o>--r c

Phone

'

. ..

--------------------------~----------------------------------------------------

1.

.

Are:.s of Ex::::e!:"-::ise ·

Titles

...

~

o re d. t·-y G-i~ r/t r1 I-J
2.

Hi::.i!:':t;..":1 Salary

3.

S::ecial Skills

(fo:-eig~

la!1guage,

~:-1:1cessing,

t~'? :...r:g'

et:c.)

'
. .- ;:..·~~

...;.~;,,~,._;,:>./:~?:.:~~
3a.

D:-ive~z

Licer.se?

4.

Pas~

5.

Ac::e~t~ble

Grad~ate

De~:-ees

.. ... ·-

. :,. ,

Nork Locations

yes
or
no

Full-c.i:::e

6.

(s;::eci.:y)

I

yes
or
no

·'··

I Woulc

part-ti~e

be co:-:.siC.ered?

yes
or
no

yes
or
?a:-~-ti::ie

no

c=J

Woulc :ull-ti::le be cc::siC.e:-ed?
l3 •

7.

C=:J

~·1eekencs?

LI

1
9. AC.dt.
..,. 1 Phone No.

-------------------r-----~---------------------------------------------------~

;..G=:::C"! .

TI~LE

DIS?OS :::::'!0~!

..
ATTACHMENT .
E

.:

:; ~~

~~~·~ · ~6~--~~ · · .

.. ·-··.- -·- ··

OFFICE OF THE M..~YOR

...

RESUME COVER SHEET

\.

,:::ffe:JL ~~

~~·--_-<?_=-_~~~----

Date Rec ' d

Re:::::l--'-S-o_u_r_c_e__

------------------------------------------------------------------------1.

Titles

Areas of Expertise

Principal Admin.

(adrnin.-03; statistics-32)

~sociate

E, "''
~ -

"'\
.DO'\.
~ _
vv~

2.

Minimum Sa 1 ary

3.

Special Skills (foreign language, typing, word processing, etc.)

~u.~ l}J· ~~

3a. Driver's · License?

~O
-----

4. Post Graduate Degrees
(specify)
----------~
-···- -----. •-w -rr~,._, . .... ...,..... .. ~-•· ••.. ,,
":'---.t.-.... • ,,.,,,
-· · ~-...; ;;,~'; ..,.:.~-......,.- . .... ... ... ..~ • ....; ..~~ ..... •· •
;
• ~· - ·. ••
5.
Acceptable Work Locations
FiLL ~shs <F ~~ ~~-J.~
Jl- ••J•• ...

yes
or
no

6.

Full-time .~ Would part-time be considered?

yes
or
no

Part-time

7.

c=J Would

Shift Hork?

yes
or
no

CJ
yes
or
no

full-time be considered?

8. Weekends?

CJ

/

9. Addt' 1 Phone No.

--------- ---------r--------.-----------------------;,.;-------------------DATE

AGENCY

TITLE

DISPOSITI01'1

'•

ATTA<

\

OFFICE OF THE

M.~YOR

RESUME COVER SHEET

Nam4-&~KJ-UffMkfimn~.eferral So~rce' l ~
lV

Ethnicity

sex

F

Phone

·$___

Date Rec'd _,....__

C:21d-)_·-_ __

-------------------------------------------~=---------------------------------~ ~

1.

Areas of Exnertise

Titles

.1

(aaministrative-03)

Principal Admin. Asscciate

2.

Hinimu::t Salary

3.

S9ecial Skills

12c,CJC...lQ

(foreign language, typing, word processing, etc.)

3a. Driver's License?

~

I

t:;')

4.

Post Graduate Degrees

(specify)

5.

Acce!;Jtable Work Locations }JO

s:r. I) ()f-£~--\?' .q..Q(1ttNs6.

yes
or
no

yes
or
·· no

yes
or
no

yes
or
no

Full-time 1~ 8 21 Would part-time be considered?

7.

c:::=J Would
a.

full-time be considered?
Weekends?

9.

'it?~

Shift Work?

c==J
CJ

10. Addt' 1 Phone No.

-

-----------------------------------------------------------.
.

.

AGENCY

D!\TE

DI SPOS ITIOl-!

TITLE

..

'1

'·
'I

ATTACHMENT
E

. -·
···~.

.

~

... .. :. .

-~---- ·

.

(

Date or Review

..

;;J.F/

OFFICE OF THE

.

..

Sex

M.~YOR

RESUME COVER SHEET

Name/)od~
Ethnicity

... , ... ,

Referral Source

M

d'§ & M J -. Date

Rec'd

Phone

(l.U-d._. (

-------------------------------------~------=-------------------------- ---

1.

Titles

Areas of Exoertise

Principal Admin. Associate

( administrative-03; contracts-11;
analyst-04)

Assistant Project Coord.
Staff Analyst

2.

Minimum Salary

3.

Special Skills (foreign language, typing, word processing, etc.)

-\
3a. Driver's License?

ye-5

4;

~ost Graduate Degrees

5.

Acceptable tvork Locations

(specify)

~N\j e. ()Q..c.')~

yes
or
no

6...

Full-time

ISfZ3 Would

yes
or
no

part-time be considered?

(hlg

yes
yes
or
or
no
no
Part-time c=Jwould full-time be conside~ed? . c:::=J
7.

Shift tlork?

\\0

8.

~'leekends?

NO

9. Addt 1 l Phone No.

-------------------------------------------------------- ---------------Jl.GENCY

-DATE

I

TITLE

'l

DIS?OSITIOt-!

I

.

--ATT.il

Date of Review
OFFICE OF THE M..~YOR

.. . . .

-----

RESUME COVER SHEET
Referral Source
Ethnicity

·

.

-rl~:::~~~;:.· ;

H

::J1J G" JJ.
---------

Date Rec'd

fV\ · Phone

Sex

·-..-·
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------,
·:: ~::~:~:.:·.
.
..·.

.

l:~;j~e~teS

.;: _.

~

Areas of Exnertise

. ;it~.~~ ~. s"~s~/

·:

y~:\'r ,

ri~ ·

. .·:;":: ~ .C,,v~. ~ - ~~
· .. ·· · · ~.s~·~

... ,. .....
.·
-~

JU U ~I u;-··.51!
CAJN n--

fl

veJ I JU

2.

Minimwn Salary

3.

Special Skills (foreign language, typing, word processing, etc.)
..

-~

..

.

.·:·'.

·.::....
·.:. .

3a. Drivers License?

4.
.__;_':Z..- •

5.

Post

Gr~~uate

-;~..,__

... , ..... · 1·· ,-.·. -

Degrees - · .. _ _ _ _ _..__ _ _ (specify)

-·.. --: . . .

Acceptable Work

"'-:-

··-.

-

...:·..'.

... .....,.. ..
:..

Loca~ions

yes
yes
or
. . or
no
no
6 •• · Full-time
Would p~rt-time be considered?
yes
yes
or
or
no
no
Part-time c=Jwould full-time be -considered? c==J

~

. . .

c==J

c::=:J

7 •·

·•·.

8. Weekends?

Shift Hork?

I
4

9. Addt'l -Phone No.
.z

.
------------------1---------.-----------------------------------------------.

DATE

AGENCY

~f :j5'1.

.

.,

.

I

-

.

TITLE

DISPOSITIOr-!

-·

~Nc11- ~~ ~ <LCB ~c1

l)c?P

I
I

I

'~ .

I
I
I

I

ATTACHMENT
._, .

·~i~.~-~ ·!\.

......·:.;._

..

I

~

::'.:'·"

• I

"" .

E

Date of Review
OFFICE OF THE

'+/ io1 e

~L~YOR

RESUME COVER SHEET

·-

Name

'7Ae. f/frnA-

Ethnicity

Ref err al Source .LA Po ~-r. e /

l.Jr;;/rU f2/1.,,
Sex

· f,,.,j

J/2. ·

Date Rec'd 3//b/

Phone

· ------------------------------------------~-----------------------------

1.

Areas of Exoertise

Titles

)

Nurse's Aide

(

Office Associate
Shop Clerk

2.

Minimum Salary

3.

Special Skills {foreign language, typing, word processing, etc : )

~ Q: ~ L00'ic\.s
3a. Driver's License? ~
4.

Post Graduate Degrees

5.

Acceptable Work Locations

{specify)

ClU(lllU'='f,0.

~o.Q~p . ,R_ j

yes
or
no

yes
. or
no
. 6. • Full-time
Would part-time be considered? ~
y s
yes
or
or
no
no
Part-time c=Jwould full-time be considered?

IQ<-4

r==J

7.

Sh~ft Hork? ~

8 . Weekends?

~ 9. Addt'l Phone No.

-----------------------·-------1------------------------------AGENCY
TITLE
DISPOS
-DATE
-

ITI0~1

-

I

.,

-

'I

..

.

ATTA

Attachment F

..

:

MINORITY HIRES
CITYWIDE . CITYWIDE DISCRETIONARY · TALENT BANK

Fiscal Year*

Total

Citywide

Citvwide

Discretiona~

Talent Bank

1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87

5,796
8,362
8,117
6,850

49.28%
52.84%
54.60%
56.24%

2,633
5,026
5,090
** 4 532

48.72%
51.64%
54.32%
58.52%

145
238
208
334

39.51 %
50.32%
51.23%
68.30%

1983-87

29,125

53.31 %

17,281

53.58%

925

53.31 %

1983-8"4

198-1-85

'

1985-86

1986-87

FISCAL YEAR "'

.,

-.

"CfTYV,1DE. TAL.E:--1 DA.'iK. FISCAL YEAR E..'iDl!'G DATE. JU!'E 30.
C:T\-V.lDE DISCR£110:-iARY. FISCAL YEAR E.'iDl!'G DATE. Ai'RJL 30.
•• C:TYV.lDE DISCRETIO!'AR Y FIGURES: ).IA Y

l~

· FEBRUARY l?o!7.

ATTACHMENT
F

..

.. ~
FEMALE HIRES
CITYWIDE · CITYWIDE DISCRETIONARY . TALENT BANK

Fiscal Year*

Citywide

Citywide

.

Discretiona~

··
,·

..·. ..

Talent Bank
. .
·'.

Total

1983-84
1984-85
1985-86
1986-87

4,046
5,518
5,730
5,035

34.40%
34.87%
38.54%
41.34%

1983-87

20,329

37.21 %

2,488
4,412 .
4,357
** 3 923

'

15,180

98
129
144
165

26.70% I
27.27% . .
35.47%
33.74o/o

47.07%

536

30.89%

•

· CITYWIDE
0
CITY DISC
0

w

T. BANK

a:
:I:
Ill

w
-'

·'

~

w

u.
:I!

2~1------------------------~---J

1983-84

1984-85

1985-86

1986-87

FISCAL YEAR "

.,

-.

• CITY\l.10E. TALE.ST OA.'il;. F:SCAL YEAR E.'iOl:'iG DATE. JU:'iE J(l
CITYV..~OE D:SCR£'10SARY. l':scAL YEAR E:'iOISG DATE. APRIL J(l
•• C:-n'\\mE o:SCR..."110SAilY F:G:JRF.S: !>!AY 19'50. FEBRUARY 19'17.

.

46.04%
45.33%
46.50%
50.65%

5~~--------------------------~

.. .

~ ·.

ATTACHMENT
F

l

,~.

"

H I R I NG P A T T E R NS

F I S C A l Y E A R S*

CITY\llDE
GENDER & ETHNIC
CLASSIFICATION

1983·84

TALENT BANK

CITY\llDE DISCRETIONARY

1984-85 1985·86 1986·87

1983·84 1984-85

PAGE 1

1 9 8 3 - 1 9 8 7

1985·86 1986·87**

1983·84 1984-85

.

1985-86 1986·87

~

FE HALE ·\IH ITE

1,221
10.38X

1,508
9.53X

1,574
10.59X

1,285
10.55X

1,013
18. 75X

1,692
17.38X
'

1,505
16.06X

1,292
16.68X

38
10.35X

45
9.51X

51
12.56X

46
9.41X

I

~

I

2,225
18.92X

3,076
19.44X

3,306
22.24X

2,893
23.75X

1, 157
21.41X

2,083
21.40X

2,244
23.95X

2,010
25.95X

44
11.99X

50
10.57X

54
13.JOX

86
17.59X

FEHALE·HISPANIC

516
4.39X

806
5.09X

723
4.86X

749
6.15X

265
4.90X

53.0
5.45X

510
5.44X

532
6.87X

13
3.54X

33
6.98X

33
8.13X

29
5.93X

FEHALE·ASIAN

78
0.66X

116
0.73X

120
0.81X

100
0.82X

53
0.98X

107
1.10X

98
1.05X

87
1.12X

0.27X

0.21X

6
1.48X

3
0.61X

2
0.03X

2
0.54X

o.oox

FEHALE·BLACK

1

1

i

FEHALE·AH. IND.

6
0.05X

12
0.08X

7
0.05X

8
0.07X

0

o.oox

0

o.ciox

0

o.oox

0

D

o.oox

0.20X

-------·--------------·------------ ----------------------------------------;---------------------------------------------·--------------TOTAL FEHALE

4,046
34.40X

5,518
34.87X

5, 730
38.54X

5,035
41.34X

2,488
46.04X

4,412
45.33X

4,357
46.50X

3,923
50.65X

98
26.70X

129
27.27X

144
35 .4 rr.

I.

* CITY\llDE, TALENT BANK - FISCAL YEAR ENDING DATE, JUNE 30.

CITY\llDE DISCRETIONARY · FISCAL YEAR ENDING DATE, APRIL 30.

>
>
H
H

'"rj

~

z

H

** NINE MONTH PERl<X>, HAY - FEBRUARY.

165
33.74X

·~

'··
.:'i

H I R I NG P A T T E R NS

CITYUIDE

f I

S C A L Y E A R S*

PAGE 2

1 9 8 3 • 1 9 8 7

CITYUIDE DISCRETIONARY

.
.

TALENT BANK

GEHDER & ETHNIC
CLASSi~ICATION

1983·84

1984·85

1985·86 1986-87

1983-84

1984-85

1985-86 1986-87**

1983-84

-~

1984-85

1985-86

1986-87

109
22.29X

-

MALE·UHITE

4, 744
40.34X

5,954
37.6JX

5, 176
34.82X

4,045
33.21X

1, 758
32.53Y.

3,015
30.98X

2,775
29.62Y.

1, 921
24.80X

184
50.14X

190
40.17X

147
36.21X

MALE·BLACK

1, 911
16.25X

2,758
17.43X

2,532
17.03X

1,904
15.63X

759
14.05Y.

1,528
15.70X

1,495
15.96X

1,246
16.09X

48
13.08X

89
18.82X

17.73X

130
26.58X

MALE·HISPANIC

836
7 .11X

1,325
8.37X

1, 120
7.53X

956
7.85X

314
5.81X

591
6.07X

513
5.47'.(

478
6.17'.(

32
8.72X

59
12.47X

39
9.61X

70
14.31X

MALE·ASWI

211
1. 79X

262
1.66X

300
2.02X

234
1.92X

85
1.57'.(

187
1.92X

230
2.45X

175
2.26X

5
1.36X

4
0.85X

o.m

12
2.45X

13
o,,.11x

0.04X

9
0.06X

6
0.05X

0
o.oor.

0
o.oor.

o.oor.

2
0.03X

0
o.oox

2
0.42X

0
o.oox

3
0.61X

MALE·AM. IND.

7

0

n

4

·-·-----------·--···------------------·---------------------------------------------------------------------------·---------------------TOTAL MALE

>
H
>

H
>"rj

i
z

H

7,715
10,306
65.60X 65. 13X

9, 137
61.46X

7, 145
58.66X

• CITYUIDE, TALENT BANK • FISCAL YEAR ENDING DATE, JUNE 30.
CITYUIDE DISCRETJO~ARY • FISCAL YEAR ENDING DATE, APRIL 30.

2,916
53.96X

5,321
54.67X

5,013
53.50X

3,822
49.35X

**

269
73.30X

344
72.73X

262
64.53X

NINE MONTH PERIOD, HAY - FEBRUARY.

324
66.26X

S.

H I R I NG P A T T E R NS

·-

CITYUIOE
GEUDER & ETHNIC
CLASSIFICATION

1983-84

1984-85

1985-86

F I S C A L Y E A R S*

PAGE 3

19 8 3 - 19 8 7

TALENT BANK

CITYUIOE DISCRETIONARY
1986-87

1983-84

1984-85

1985-86 1986-87**

1983-84

1984-85 • 1985-86 1986-87

TOTAL HALE

~

10,306
7,715
65.60X 65.13X

9, 137
61 .46X

7, 145
58.66X

2,916
53.96X

5,321
54.6n:

5,013
53.50X

3,822
49.35X

269
73.30X

72. 73X

262
64.53X

324
66.26X

TOTAL FEHALE

4,046
34.40X

5,518
34.87X

5,730
38.54X

5,035
41.34X

2,488
46.04X

4,412
45.33X

4,357
46.50X

3,923
50.65X

98
26.70X

129
27.27X

144
35.47X

165
33.74X

TOTAL MINORITY

5,796
49.28X

8,362
52.84X

8, 117
54.60X

6,850
56.24X

2,633
48.72X

5,026
51.64X

5,090
54.32X

4,532
58.52X

145
39.51X

238
50.32X

. 208
51.23X

334
68.30X

TOTAL HIRES

CITYUIDE

TOTAL HALE
1983 - 1987

7,745
5,404
9,733
9,370
100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X

11, 761
15,824
14,867 12, 180
100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X

c4 ·

344

406
489
473
367
100.00X 100.00X 100.00X 100.00X

TALENT BANK

CITYUIDE DISCRETIONARY

1, 199

34,303
62.79X

17,072
52.93X

69.11X

TOTAL FEHAL~
1983 - 1987

20,329
37.21X

15,180
47.0TX

536
30.89X

TOTAL MINORITY
1983 - 1987

29 125
53.311.

17,281
53.581.

925
53.31X

TOTAL HIRES
1983 - 1987

54,632
100.00X

32,252
100.001.

1, 735
100.00X

I

~

H
>'%j

:i:--

~

z

H

• CITYUIDE, TALENT BANK· FISCAL YEAR ENDING DATE, JUNE 30.
CITYUIDE DISCRETIONARY • FISCAL YEAR ENDING DATE, APRIL 30.

**

NINE MONTH PERIOD, MAY • FEBRUARY.

. ..

Attachment G

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LABORERS
Calendar Year
1984

Sex and Ethnicitv Breakdown
Total DEP Laborer Hires

= 78

DEP Laborer Hires from Talent Bank

White Males
White Females
Black Males
Black Females
Hispanic Males

48
2
8
4
8

70

Source - DEP
Personnel Records

=

70

Source - Talent
Bank Records

€ 8 . 5 7 ~"'-----7 1

2. 86%--

11.43~>
~
...J •

..,,
'

~
..... ' ;)

-.

..., 0
'-

v

C:./~

• -

'

~

11.43%
100%

Demoarcohic Breakdown

Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Staten Island
Queens
Westchester
Long Island

4 ~ !1:• - 0

Source - DEP
Perscnnel Records
4
20

14

5.13%
25.64%

1
1

17.95%
30.77%
17.95%
1. 28%
1. 28%

78

100%

24

14

.,
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DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LABORERS
Calendar Year
1985

Sex and Ethnicitv Breakdown
Tctal DEF Laborer Hires

= 119

DEF Laborer Hires from Talent Bank

White Males
White Females

67

Black Males
Black Females
Hispanic Males
Hispanic Females
Indian Males

10

Source - DEP
Personnel Records

=

103

Source - Talent Ba n
Records

1
3

20
1
1

103

9.71%~
""' f"\., o..
L. • ::J

~

..0

19.42%/33.98%
. . 97%
.97%
100 %

Democraohic Breakdown

Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Staten Island
Queens
Westchester
Unknown

Source - DEP
Personnel Records
7

28
. 30
26
25
2
1

5.88%
23.53.?c>
25.21%
21. 85%
21.01%
1. 68%
.84%

119

.... , <j> ..... ... .. .

-.
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Total Hires (1984 and 1985) for
Assistant Highway Repairer, Debris
Remover, Deckhand and Ferry Agent
White Males
White Females
Black Males
Black Females
Hispanic Males
Hispanic Females

139
1

47

Source:
DOT EEO Reports
and Personnel
Records
67.5%
.5%

1

22.8%
1. 0%
7.7%
.5%

206

100%

2

16

Total Hires (1984 and 1985) for
Assistant Highway Repairer, Deckhand
and Ferry Agent
White Males
White Females
Black Males
Black Females
Hispanic Males

"

114
1

10

Source:
DOT EEO Reports
and Personnel
Records
85.1%
.7%

8

7.5%
.7%
. 6.0%

134

100%

1

.,
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Deckhand
Calendar Year
1984
Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown
DOT Deckhand Hires from Talent Bank

White Males
Total DOT Deckhand Hires
White Males

7

=

=

7

Source: Talent
Bank Records
100%

11
11

100%

Demographic Breakdown
Manhattan
Brooklyn
Staten Island
Queens

Source:
DOT
EEO Reports and
Personnel Records

Source:
DOT
Personnel Records
1

4
5
1

9.1%
36.4%
45.4%
9.1%

11

100%

.,

.,
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Deckhand
Calendar Year
1985

Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown
DOT Deckhand Hires from Talent Bank

White Males
Black Males
Hispanic Males

Total DOT Deckhand Hires

White Males
Black Males
Hispanic Males

= 26

Source: Talent
Bank records

23
2
1

88.5%

26

100%

7.7%
3.8%

= 27

Source: DOT
EEO Reports and
Personnel Records
24

88.9%

2
1

7.4%
3.7%

27

100%

Demographic Breakdown
Brooklyn
Staten Island
Queens
Unknown

Source: DOT
Personnel Records
6

22.2%

18

66.7%
7.4%
3.7%

2
1

27

~

-100%

-.
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ferry Agent

Calendar Year
1984

Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown
DOT Ferry Agent Hires from Talent Bank

=

5

Source: Talent
Bank Records

White Males

3

60.0%

Black Males
Hispanic Males

l

1

20.0%
20.0%

5

100%

Total DOT Ferry Agent Hires = 9

Source:
DOT
EEO Reports and
Personnel Records

White Males
White Females

5
1

55.6%
11.1%

Black Males
Hispanic Males

2
1

22.2%
11.1%

9

100%

Demographic Breakdown
Bronx
Brooklyn
Staten Island
Unknown

Source:
DOT
Personnel Records
1
1

5
2
9

••

11.1%
11.1%
55.6%
22.2%
'i;.

100%

•1
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ferry Agent
Calendar Year
1985

Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown
DOT Ferry Agent Hires from Talent Bank

White Males
Black Males

Total DOT Ferry Agent Hires

White Males
Black Males

=

= 9

Source: Talent
Bank Records

6
3

66.7%
33.3%

9

100%

6

Source:
DOT
EEO Reports and
Personnel Records
1

83.3%
16.7%

6

100%

5

Demographic Breakdown
Staten Island
Queens
Unknown

Source:
DOT
Personnel Records
3
2
1

50.0%
33.3%
16.7%

6

100%

.,
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Assistant Highway Repairer
Calendar Year
1985

Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown
Source: Talent
Bank Records

DOT Assistant Highway Repairer
Hires from Talent Bank = 35
White Males
Black Males
Black Females
Hispanic .Males

20

57.1%

7
7

20.0%
2.9%
20.0%

35

100%

1

Total DOT Assistant Highway Repairer Hires

White Males
Black Males
Black Females
Hispanic Males

=

44

36

81. 8%

4
1
3

9.1%
2.3%
6.8%

44

100%

2
6
6

4.5%
13.6%

13
10

-t2 9. 6%
22. 7"o

7

16. O"o

Source:
DOT
EEO Reports and
Personnel Records

Demographic Breakdown
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Staten Isl.:rnd
Queens
Unknown

lJ.6?.;

1 OO"o

-.
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Debris Remover
Calendar Year
1984

Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown

DOT Debris Remover Hires from Talent Bank =·20
White Males
Black Males
Black Females
Hispanic Males
Hispanic Females

Total DOT Debris Remover Hires

7

35.0%

10
1
1
1

50.0%
5.0%
5.0%
5.0%

20

100%

=

43

Source:
DOT
EEO Reports and
Personnel Records

White Males

20

46.5%

Black Males
Black Females
Hispanic Males
Hispanic Females

15
1

34.9%
2.3%
14.0%
2.3%

43

100%

1
6

Demographic Breakdown
M<:rnhatt~rn

Bron>:
I3roo}:l yn
St.:iten Isl.:rnd
Queens
tJn}:no ·.·m

2
8

s

Source: Talent
Bank Records

'i:.

4. 7 ~.,

Source:
DOT
Personnel Records

18.G~
18.6~0

5
7

11. 6%
16. J ':;

lJ

J0.:2 ~

.\ J

100 ~;

'•

-.
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Debris Remover
Calendar Year
1985
Sex and Ethnicity Breakdown
DOT Debris Remover Hires from Talent Bank
White Males
Black Males

Total DOT Debris Remover Hires

White Males
Black Males
Hispanic Males

=

15

11

26.7%
73.3%

15

100%

4

=

Source:
DOT EEO
Reports and
Personnel Records

29

5

17.2%

22
2

75.9%
6.9%

29

100%

Demographic Breakdown
Manhattan
Bronx
Brooklyn
Staten Island
Queens
Unknown

Source:
DOT
Personnel Records
4
4
4

2
6
9

29

'•

Source: Talent
Bank Records

13.8%
13.8%
13.8%
6.9%
20.7%
31. 0%
100 %

-.
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~ASTNAME

FIRST

AREA AGNCYNM

Rotler't

vl 1 r1 DOT

----------

·r. .

HIREDATE SALARY

-------06/25/84

TITLE

CC•ri1fJlE

---------- ---------- ----20211 ASST.
HWY. REP.

HIREL.

,;.

-WARNING- No rows satisfy the WHERE clause

~ ~

LASTNA:v!E

FIRST

------------------Johr1
Arg ier1tC•
. Deutcher1
,,

\LO Di G i arm i

AREA AGNCYNM
drnrc

()p-~~

HIREDATE SALARY

TITLE

c•:•rnrnE

---------- -------- ---------- ---------- ----DOT
05/18/84
20211 ASST.
HIRED

Ge•:•rge

dmrc DOT

05/18/84

~iit·=·

dmrc DOT

1215/15/84

HWY. REP.
21Zl2 l 1 ASST.
!-!WY. R.---,
i::.l- •
14781 DEBRIS

-!.-·.·- .

HI REC

HI REC

REiY!O'v'E ~

Schiulaz

!

L1:1Be 11 r:'

Christoohe drnrc DOT
r
J1:ihr1
drnrc BUILDil\iGS

llZl/15/84 -010/08/84

l

HIRE[

SERV.
INSP.
E. ili!Zi tZl URBAN

HjRE~

, act i.

TEC:-1.

b~·~\._

IJ~

Macchia
LAS TN AME

---------Lo:iBe 11 •:•

2(&<

/)er->

lASO~t!l~v~ a~

a1 r1.
HIRED

dmrc DOT

tZl5/15/.'34

Joseph
first

drnrc DEi=•
area reosal

12/01/84 -QILABORER
HIRED
titll titl2 titl3 TITL4 er1dt

JO:•i1i'1

dmrc
C!mrc

DiCarlucci J•:•hn

·=·

~

14781 DEBRIS
~EiY!OVE~

---------Michael

-----------$15, IZllZllZI. 01Zl

..

----- ----- ----- ----- --------

11Z1132 11Z1112 8tZI 112 22100 il18/01/84
08/14/84 '
$12, 371. tZltZI E.tZl61 7 5E.IZl56 61Z!41Zl7 -0-

0 (}.

~

-WARNING- No rows satisfy the WrlERE clause
area reasal
first
titll titl2 t1tl3 TITL4 enct

LP.S7NAME

M

---------- -----------.

Alvarez

Herbert E

grc

$17,~00.00

10112 1 0132 10104 -0-

!Zi8/01 /83

Ex /-h-bi-T

1-Jfred

#b

f'/lc; rL~y

~

s/7 / Jfr1;:1

t>.TTACRM"E.ll'l'.

·3

l

l

~

i

;j

ii

ii
~'1
last narne

FI HST

HI REDATE TITLE

Thomas

flt:::: f~'

Ca 1 a bro:• ·
Col ·:•r1
b.:1 l l i na

-0LABORER
04/09/84 LADOl~Eri
03/04/85 U~BOHER

i/EP

JC.\SWi Cl<.

Lt::r:-

,Paq l i nco

:: iEil· 1L: 'i'Nl~I

:

IJ ~:. i:'
nr::~ ·

U~BORER

Tom

02/01/85

u:rnur~EH

09/16/85 Laborer C

Walden
bill

Theo
Fred
Kenneth
John
Reynold

01/01/85 L... noo1:~EH
04/09/84 Uff<lJF<ER C
04/01/85 Collepe Aide

j E~ i.-. C: .::•

\,/ 1 Y1CC7.l"1t

05/15/85 Motor Vehicle

Caraoullo

,Ji::1st-:?

11/01/84 DEGRiS REMOVER

L 1o r1~ ~1

1YI i ci1ae l

iz14/(::·:.;/05

Pf2i"'ry
bc.:t-1nf~ i

cJer
!311.tt sl1.y

I .

DL1:..
Lii~ I-~'

("Jf

!)(;,pt.

L (···•.-. ·•.' E~ c ·c
i .... :,,::.

l

~3/04/85

area E S

J;
':. ;
.f

gldn C l"l
26518 glcm H M

01/01/8~

U1::: ;-'
l,.

--------------- -Ill----------

Lawrence
Scott

r · ... . ·,
j ;

Luis

SALARY

25518

c

J
"iiI'

C i°'I
•7.:E~':i1H g ldn C M
L::: G5 1 8 g 1 d i'1 C f't1
•7.:~-11 6':1 [J
..... 1 [; \ri i) l'tJ
2G518 g l dn l.~ r'i
•7.:E.:7H 8 f~ 1 c n C 1~1
c~E.518 glcln Ee frl
p 1 air1 B !YI
gldi'I

t

ii

.

LfiHU t~t.: f< C

-121-

11
:1
I

I
I

I

f

•=• ·r-1

11 t.;1{)1L1

~J

l Ci i "I C

r!

I~:

Uo<=r.
:~

J

i::.i

I

i"• t:i :

l 5tZl1Z11Z1 P. l d .,.., H 1~·1
g l cJn C 11 1

bC:t~11.

1~j158

·j

:t l\ibF·ECTDI~
j i l~J I

Cruz

1. l · i

1 '• 1 -~:,·,··t

I .ll .J I

i:.• 1

i •lJ

I

I.i i .l 1
1-·· t ii.~ ~.
... : ;1 • . •...I

r,1 /

C:.::::

f."i

!~ E!

i

i"1i::!Z

1 :L l

Jorge

09/01/84 ATTENDANT .

131Z11Z11Z1 g lo n

Jose
Thomas

t!:\•~/

17ti22

~:1

l ct;·, . 1""1 l'i

IZI

[}

1 Cf ·lrl C M

23/ 84 t ·E 1h~ 'f ~1GENT
1Z1fl/ti.:11 I iV1 Utff<f'..ll ·J TECH.
1Z1L1/2'3/f:l5 ;::•(-1i-1 I l

~:· • .tll"L:.1

c~ri

n·,.. . .-, ~, l; 1-i:::in n

Cyr11

1:{ 1 vt::- ·1·a

Noroerto

ll/01/h4 DEGRiS REMOVER
08/01/84 puto Mechanic

Li:;. l

fh.?yl"101 d

·-·V.1-·-

-121 ...

-IZ1-

.\./ l. i'1Ci:?i" d;

-~~I -··

····· Iii ·

--1{)-

.l

'1.

t: ~\ .. 1C.'()

r:) 1 Cff1
1 ~)1/11Z11£1 g 1 c ,..,
l 3 "1A r; l Cl'1"1
g l c,·,··,
rJ 1 c.1 ·,·,

261L.l1ZllLI

H M

'i

,i

C M

:1
I,

D 1,1
h

..'I,

IYI

·.,

B r•l
[;

jYj

/

,.

/

TutK4- l_

c:2
5·
5

~1~(

B/ I-/

I J . C'-/1-f

'i
.!

~l

.r
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THE CITY OF' NEW YORK
0,.,.ICE
NEW

01'" THE

MAYOR

YORK, N . Y. I000 7

JOSEPH In VINCENZO
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE MAYOR.

~)
A.Pi.(<..__.~

~°""""~LI.
I'\ HGZ '.>
_k~
I

0.-'-'.

~'\,~~

..
ATTACHMENT
J

.

,.. .
;,

;'

.

.~ ·
\

.

ASSISTANT HIGHWAY
Christopher Schuilaz

-

Bronx, NY
( 212) .

10465
( 212)

~

Russell Lockwood

1)

William Hnatio

Staten Island, NY
( 718)

Bklyn, NY
(718)

10301

11209

I

Joseph Curry

lf) Staten Island,

NY

10308

( 718)

j)

Ernest Moerlins
Staten Island, NY 10304
(718) :

bGiovanni Buono
Staten lsland, NY
( 718)

l

Ric~ard

Kilichowski

Staten Island, NY
(718)

J Isidor

10303

10306

Suarez

Bkiyn, NY
(718)

~ ~alph

Hollis, NY
( 718)

IL)

\~ v~

Slaton

11423

~ohn Prociw

Astoria, NY
( 718)

/I

Dave Eichele
Astoria, NY
( 718)

/~obe~t Najdek
Astoria, NY

11105
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ASSISTANT HIGHWAY REPAIRER

;~

\

.•

(])

Hak Kyu Song
Queens, NY
(718)

~

11402

.

Arnold Mitchem
Bronx, NY

10452

Christopher Mustaciuhlo
Staten Island, NY
( 718)

Anthony Joseph Ruiz

NY, NY
(212)

Frank Ressa, Jr.
Bklyn, NY

11219

Tony Cincotta
Bklyn, NY
(718)

Eric Stevenson
Br6nx, NY

10468

Joseph D. Carbone
Woodhaven, NY
(718)

11421

.,
ATTACHMENT
J

